Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2002

Daniel K. Dygert and Stephanie C. Dygert v. Alan
M. Collier and Mike Youngberg : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert W. Hughes; Counsel for Appellees.
Marty E. Moore; Bearnson & Peck; Counsel for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Dygert v. Collier, No. 20020878 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4018

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case No. 20020878

IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DANIEL K. DYGERT and STEPHANIE C. DYGERT,
Plaintiffs and Appellants

ALAN M. COLLIER and MIKE YOUNGBERG,
Defendants and Appellees

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from the Second District Court, Davis County
The Honorable Glen R. Dawson

ROBERT W. HUGHES(#1573)
LC
111 East 300 South, Suite 370
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 364-9075
Counsel for Appellees

BEARNSON & PECK,
Marty E. Moore (#8932)
74 West 100 North
Logan, UT 84321
(435) 787-9700
mmoore@cachelaw.com
Counsel for i^uielLajTis*
Utah Cmmrt nf Ampioalc

JUN 0 3 2003
Pautette Stagg

LIST OF ALL PARTIES BELOW
Plaintiffs:

Daniel K. Dygert
Stephanie C. Dygert

Defendants: Chicago Title Insurance Company
Bonneville Title Company, Inc.
Clearwater Oaks, L.C.
Alan M. Collier
Mike Youngberg

CITATIONS TO RECORD
Citations to the record on appeal will be designated in parenthesis as RA followed
by the page number(s) assigned by the clerk of court below in the judgment roll and
index, e.g., (RA 103) designates record on appeal page 103.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ALL PARTIES BELOW

i

CITATIONS TO RECORD

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

v

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1

1

Issue No. 2

1

Standard of Review

2

Citation to Record

2

CITATION OF LEGAL AUTHORITIES
16-10a-622 Liability of shareholders

4

48-2c-104 Separate legal entity

4

48-2c-l 16 Member or manager as a party to proceedings

4

48-2c-601 General rule

4

57-3-102 Record imparts notice -Change in interest rate —Validity of document —
Notice of unnamed interests —Conveyance by grantee
4
68-3-1 Common law adopted

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

12

ii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
First Argument

18

Second Argument

18

Third Argument

19

ARGUMENT
I.

II.

III.

20

Appellees Are Personally Liable for Their Own Tortious Acts Committed
on Behalf of Their LLC.
Tort Law

20

Agency Law

27

Tort and Agency Law

27

Appellees Individually Owed Multiple Duties to the Dvgerts. Including: 1)
A Duty Not to Injure: 2) A Duty to Refrain from Acts that Were
Reasonably Risky: 3) A Duty to Disclose a Material Defect: and 4) A Duty
to Supply Correct Information.

Duty Not To Injure

32

Duty To Refrain From Risky Acts

32

Duty to Disclose Known Material Defects

33

Duty to Supply Correct Information

33

The Dygerts Justifiably Relied Upon Appellees Misrepresentations About
The True State Of Title To The Property They Were Purchasing.
34
Constructive Notice Not Applicable

37

Justifiable Reliance Is Jury Issue

38

iii

CONCLUSION

39

ADDENDUM
Order granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment (RA 758, 759)... A-l
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (RA 752-755)

A-3

Map of Subdivision

A-7

18B Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 1877 (1985)

A-8

Personal Liability of Corporate Officers,
For the Defense, June 2002, pp. 44-59

A-13

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Baldwin v. Burton,
850 P.2d 1188 (UT 1993)
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.,
666 P.2d 302 (UT 1983)
Dugan v. Jones,
615P.2d

)

19, 33, 35, 37, 38

19,35,37,38

Hermansen v. Tasulis,
48 P.3d 235 (UT 2t

18 ; ~0,33

Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum, L.L.C.,
70 S.W. 3d 252 (Tex.App.- San Antonio, 2001)
haitntans v. White Star Gas & Oil Co., et al,
63 P.2d231 (UT 1936)

18, 27, 29, 32

Low v. CityofMonticello,
54 P.3d 1153 (UT 2002)

^0

Murphey Tugboat Co., Ltd. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., Ltd,
467 F.Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal. 1979), affd 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
/.„.;.„/ 455 U.S. 1018, 102 S.Ct. 1713 (1982)

28

Pentecost v. M. W. Harward,
699 P.2d 696 (UT 1985)

15?. 27. 29, 32

PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha,
78 Cal.App.4th I WiS (Ciil.App.AI .!0<H>|

Reedeker v. Salisbury,
952 P.2d 577 (UT Ap^

1

j

Robinson v. Tripco Investments, Inc.,
21 P.3d 219 (UT App. 2000)

19, 38
v

Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc.,
10 P.3d 338 (UT 2000)

12

Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (UT 1985)

39

WebBankv. American General Annuity Service Corp.,
54P.3d 1139 (UT2002)

2

STATUTES
18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1877

18,22,27,28

CJA 4-501

9

Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P

7, 8,10

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-622

4,24

Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-12 (2)

24

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-101 etseq

21, 24

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-104

4, 21,24

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-116

4, 21, 24

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-601

4, 21, 24

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102

4

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1

5,25

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)

1

vi

OTHER AUTHORITIES
"Asset Protection: Domestic and International Law And Tactics, Chapter 18 Limited
Liability Companies," Duncan E. Osborne and Elizabeth Morgan Shurig, 2 Asset
Protection: Dom. & Int'l L. & Tactics § 18:08, 2002
26
"Limited Liability Companies: Issues In Member Liability," Karin Schwindt, 44 UCLA
L.Rev. 1541, 1548
25
"Personal Liability of Corporate Officers" [June 2002, "For The Defense"]

23

"Tax-Advantaged Securities Handbook, Chapter 12A. The Limited Liability Company,"
Robert J. Haft and Peter M. Fass, 2 Tax Adv. Sec. Handbook § 12A:7,2002 .. 26
"Those Delaware LLCS-Another Look How They Could Work For You," Frederic J.
Bendremer,10 -JUN Bus.L.Today 43,45
25
N.J. Forms Legal & Bus. § 18A:3, 2002

26

vii

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
By order, this matter was transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court
of Appeals. (RA 813). The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provides in pertinent part:
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1
APPELLEES THEMSELVES COMMITTED TORTIOUS ACTS BY
AFFIRMATIVELY MISREPRESENTING AND CONCEALING
INFORMATION ABOUT A MATERIAL DEFECT IN RESIDENTIAL REAL
PROPERTY FROM THE DYGERTS, WHO WERE PURCHASING THE
PROPERTY. IN DOING SO, APPELLEES ACTED AS REPRESENTATIVES
OF A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY IN WHICH THEY WERE THE
ONLY TWO MEMBERS. DID APPELLEES OWE A LEGAL DUTY TO THE
DYGERTS SUCH THAT APPELLEES ARE INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE FOR
THEIR OWN TORTIOUS CONDUCT?
Issue No. 2
A TITLE COMPANY CONSPIRED WITH APPELLEES TO "INSURE OVER"
A BILLBOARD SIGN LEASE ENCUMBERING RESIDENTIAL REAL
PROPERTY BEING SOLD TO THE DYGERTS, MEANING THE LEASE
WOULD NOT BE DISCLOSED IN TITLE REPORTS. IN RELIANCE UPON
APPELLEES' AFFIRMATIVE MISSTATEMENTS AND TITLE REPORTS
REGARDING THE PROPERTY, THE DYGERTS DID NOT PERSONALLY
SEARCH TITLE RECORDS. WERE THE DYGERTS LEGALLY REQUIRED
TO SEARCH TITLE RECORDS OR DID THEY JUSTIFIABLY RELY ON
APPELLEES' AFFIRMATIVE MISSTATEMENTS AND TITLE REPORTS?
1

Standard of Review
This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment and dismissing
Plaintiffs'/Appellants' ("the Dygerts") Amended Complaint against
Defendants/Appellees Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg ("Appellees"). The
appropriate standard of review for both issues is set forth in WebBank v. American
General Annuity Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1143 (UT 2002):
A trial court may properly grant summary judgment when "there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
also Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,121, 48 P.3d 895;
Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, f 15, 44 P.3d 781; State ex rel Div. of
Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, % 8, 44
P.3d 680. The propriety of a trial court's grant of summary judgment
is a question of law. Holmes Dev., 2002 UT 38 at f 21. In deciding
whether summary judgment was appropriate, we need review only
whether the trial court erred in applying the relevant law and
whether a material fact was in dispute. Id.; Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT
16,112,28 P.3d 1271. "We thus review the trial court's legal
conclusions for correctness, according them no deference." Holmes
Dev., 2002 UT 38 at f 21; see also Ault, 2002 UT 33 at f 15.
Citation to Record
Both issues were addressed in the trial court in Appellees' pleadings entitled
Defendants, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg's, Motion for Summary Judgment and
Supporting Memorandum (RA 197-340); Defendant Alan M. Collier and Mike
Youngberg's Reply to Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (RA 447-460);
Memorandum in Support of Defendants, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg's Motion
for Summary Judgment orfor Judgment on the Pleadings (RA 566-580); Defendants
2

Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg's Reply to Plaintiffs9 Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment (RA 658-668). In addition, both issues were addressed in the trial
court in the Dygerts' pleadings entitled Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Alan
M. Collier's and Mike Youngberg's Motion for Summary Judgment (RA 374-424);
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Alan M. Collier's and Mike Youngberg's
Motion for Summary Judgment orfor Judgment on the Pleadings (RA 583-647); and
Notice of Filing of Supplemental Authorities Regarding Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants Alan M. Collier's and Mike Youngberg's Motion for Summary
Judgment or for Judgment on the Pleadings, which included a law journal article on the
issue of personal liability of corporate officers and directors (RA 648-655).

3

CITATION OF LEGAL AUTHORITIES
The following statutory provisions in Utah Code Annotated are of importance in
this appeal:
16-10a-622 Liability of shareholders.
(1) A purchaser from a corporation of shares issued by the corporation is
not liable to the corporation or its creditors with respect to the shares except to pay
or provide the consideration for which the issuance of the shares was authorized
under Section 16-10a-621 or specified in the subscription agreement under
Section 16-10a-620.
(2) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder
or subscriber for shares of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or
debts of the corporation solely by reason of the ownership of the corporation's
shares.
48-2c-104 Separate legal entity. A company formed under this chapter is
a legal entity distinct from its members.
48-2c-116 Member or manager as a party to proceedings. A member or
manager of a company is not a proper party to proceedings by or against a
company, except when the object is to enforce a member's or manager's right
against, or liability to, the company.
48-2c-601 General rule. Except as provided in Section 48-2c-602, no
organizer, member, manager, or employee of a company is personally liable under
a judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt,
obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or omissions of the company
or of any other organizer, member, manager, or employee of the company.
57-3-102 Record imparts notice —Change in interest rate —Validity of
document —Notice of unnamed interests —Conveyance by grantee.
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner
prescribed by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a
notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement
complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged shall,fromthe
time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all
persons of their contents.
4

(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying
secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document
provided under Subsection (1).
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to
the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the
document.
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration,
names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without naming
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any third person with
notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any other person not
named in the document.
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears
as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this title that sets
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and describes
the real property subject to the interest.
68-3-1 Common law adopted. The common law of England so far as it
was not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or laws of the United
States, or the constitution or laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent
with and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and the
necessities of the people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of
decision in all courts of this state.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Dygerts appeal from a final Order dated October 9, 2002 issued by the
Second District Court, the Honorable Glen R. Dawson, granting Appellees' motion for
summary judgment and dismissing the Dygerts' Amended Complaint against Appellees.
(RA 758, 759). The appeal is taken from the entire Order as well as Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law issued by the Second District Court, the Honorable Glen R.
Dawson, on the 9th day of October, 2002, and incorporated by reference into the final
Order. (RA 752-755).
The Dygerts commenced the action below by filing a Complaint in June 2001
against the following defendants: Chicago Title Insurance Company, Bonneville Title
Company, Inc., Clearwater Oaks, L.C., Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg. (RA 420). The Complaint set forth six claims: 1) fraud and misrepresentation (against all
defendants); 2) conspiracy to defraud (against all defendants); 3) negligent
misrepresentation (against all defendants); 4) breach of contract (against Defendant
Clearwater Oaks, L.C.); 5) breach of warranty (against Defendant Clearwater Oaks,
L.C.); and 6) constructive trust (against Defendants Collier and Youngberg). (RA 4-20).
After answers were filed by all the defendants and discovery begun, the trial court
granted the Dygerts leave to amend their original Complaint. (RA 363-364). The
Dygerts then filed their Amended Complaint (RA 344-362), and Appellees filed their
Answer to Amended Complaint (RA 425-434).
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Appellees first sought summary judgment under Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P., by filing a
document entitled Defendants, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg's, Motion for
Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum (RA 197-340), on the grounds that
they cannot be held personally liable for their individual acts committed on behalf of
their limited liability company ("LLC"). Included in the many exhibits attached to
Appellees' first summary judgment motion was a complete copy of Plaintiffs' Responses
to Defendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C., Alan M. Collier, and Mike Youngberg's First Set of
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions, and Requests for Production of Documents to
Plaintiffs (RA 313-329), in which the Dygerts set forth, under oath, the basis for their
claims against Appellees.
The Dygerts responded to Appellee's first motion for summary judgment by filing
their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Alan M. Collier's and Mike
Youngberg's Motion for Summary Judgment (RA 374-424), in which the Dygerts set
forth facts supported by an affidavit, deposition transcripts, discovery responses and
other documents. These facts supported the allegations against Appellees set forth in the
Dygerts' Amended Complaint (RA 344-362). Appellees then filed their Notice to Submit
for Decision (RA, 435-436), and the trial court issued its Minute Entry Ruling (RA 439),
stating that:
[I]t is the opinion of this Court that there are genuine issues of
material fact in existence in this matter which prevent the granting
of summary judgment in any of the areas submitted by counsel.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.
7

Appellees next filed a document entitled Motion for Reconsideration (RA 445446) and another entitled Defendants Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngbergs Reply to
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. (RA 447-460). In their reply
memorandum, Appellees did not dispute any of the Dygerts' statement of additional facts
in a manner contemplated by Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P., that is, by affidavit, deposition
transcript or other method. Id. Rather, Appellees reiterated their claims that it was
Clearwater Oaks, L.C. ("Clearwater Oaks") - Appellees5 limited liability company- that
committed the tortious acts alleged in the Amended Complaint. Id. Appellees thus
asserted:
The acts complained of by the Plaintiffs are clearly the acts of the
owner of the property which was the LLC. Accordingly, as a matter
of law, the individual Defendants are not and cannot be personally
liable for the acts alleged in Plaintiffs (sic) Amended Complaint.
(RA 449).
In response, the Dygerts filed a document entitled Plaintiffs' Response to
Defendants Collier and Youngberg's Motion for Reconsideration (RA 461-463) in which
the Dygerts did not object to the Court considering Appellees' reply memorandum.
However, the Dygerts did note that Appellees' reply memorandum was "replete with
factual disputes." (RA 462). The court below then heard oral argument on Appellees'
Motion for Reconsideration and denied the motion. (RA 563). The Court's ruling was
memorialized in the Order Denying Defendants Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg 's
Motion for Summary Judgment (RA 669-670).
8

Appellees then made their third attempt at summary judgment, filing a document
entitled Memorandum in Support of Defendants, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngbergs
Motion for Summary Judgment or for Judgment on the Pleadings. (RA 566-580). For
this third attempt at summary judgment, however, Appellees did not file a new motion
seeking such relief as required by CJA 4-501. Nor did Appellees' memorandum include
any exhibits. Id. Instead, Appellees re-argued their previous position that they could not
be held personally liable for the acts of their limited liability company, Clearwater Oaks,
L.C. (RA 567-569, 578-579), then raised new issues. Appellees' assertions were
summarized in the conclusion to their memorandum, which stated:
Even if the individual defendants had participated in some wrongful
act or omission, which is denied, the Plaintiffs' causes of action
based upon fraud and/or misrepresentation must be dismissed
against them personally because, as a matter of law, neither of the
individual defendants had a duty to the Plaintiffs. Further, the
Plaintiffs cannot meet the requirement that their reliance on the
statement or omission of the individual defendants was justifiable.
Plaintiffs could [not] justifiably rely on the nondisclosure of a Lease,
which Lease was a public record. Further, Plaintiffs also had
"inquiry notice" of the Lease by reason of the indication on the plat
map referencing the lease. Defendant Clearwater Oaks, the owner
and seller of the property, may have had a duty, if one existed, but
not the individual defendants personally.
(RA 579).
The Dygerts responded with their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Alan
M. Collier's and Mike Youngberg 's Motion for Summary Judgment or for Judgment on
the Pleadings. (RA 583-647). In this memorandum in opposition, the Dygerts again set
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forth numerous facts supporting their claims in their Amended Complaint against
Appellees and included supporting exhibits as required by Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P. (RA 583647). This memorandum in opposition highlighted certain of Appellees' individual
tortious actions, noted disputes over material facts and addressed the legal issues raised
by Appellees in their memorandum. (RA 584-601).
Shortly thereafter, the Dygerts also filed a document entitled Notice of Filing of
Supplemental Authorities Regarding Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants Alan M. Collier *s and Mike Youngberg 's Motion for Summary Judgment or
for Judgment on the Pleadings. (RA 648-655). Attached to the notice was an article
entitled Personal Liability of Corporate Officers that had just been published in the June
2002 edition of'The Defense" magazine. (RA 650-655).
Appellees filed their reply memorandum entitled Defendants Alan M. Collier and
Mike Youngberg's Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment (RA 658-668).
On August 20,2002, the trial court held a hearing on the third round of
memoranda regarding Appellees' efforts to obtain summary judgment or dismissal. (RA
690). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement and
scheduled a telephonic hearing on September 17, 2002 for the purpose of announcing its
ruling. Id. On September 17,2002, the trial court rendered its decision (RA 751), as set
forth in its Order (RA 758-759) and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (RA 752-
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755), both of which are dated October 9,2002 and were filed October 10, 2002. The
Dygerts timely filed their Notice ofAppeal on October 18,2002. (RA 760).
All other defendants in this action have been dismissed by order of the trial court
upon stipulation of the parties. (RA 365-366,437-438, 749-750, 756, 757). Therefore,
the October 9,2002 Order of the trial court is a final order.

11

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Appellees are developers who in 1997 organized Clearwater Oaks, L.C.
("Clearwater Oaks") for the purpose of purchasing and developing real property. (RA
197,198). Appellees were the only members of Clearwater Oaks. (RA 224, 230-233).
In 1997 Clearwater Oaks bought lots in a subdivision adjoining the west side of the 1-15
corridor in West Bountiful. (RA 347, 389). Shortly after the purchase, Appellees and
Clearwater Oaks entered into a dispute with the billboard sign company that held
leaseholdrightsto construct and maintain billboard signs on the lots Appellees had
purchased. (RA 347, 395, 398-400,407, 408,410, 411,414-417).
This dispute over the billboard sign lease lasted from 1998 until early 2000, when
a lawsuit between Clearwater Oaks and the billboard sign company was settled. Id.
Clearwater Oaks commenced its lawsuit against the billboard sign company before the
Dygerts contracted to purchase their property, and the lawsuit continued until shortly
after the Dygerts closed on the purchase of their property in December 1999. (RA 347,
395,407,411,414-417). Appellees knew that the billboard sign lease encumbered

1

The facts set forth in the Statement of Facts are drawn from the pleadings,
portions of depositions on file, responses to discovery requests on file, affidavits and
other exhibits submitted with memoranda supporting and opposing Appellees' motions
for summary judgment. See Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338,
339 (UT 2000)("summary judgment is appropriate only 'if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'")
12

the residential real property purchased by the Dygerts, yet they never once told the
Dygerts about the lease encumbrance on the property. (RA 395,408,414-417, 608610). Nor did the title company or real estate agent involved notify the Dygerts of the
existence of the billboard sign lease. (RA 610).
The Dygerts have alleged and are prepared to prove that Appellees were aware in
1999 that disclosure of the billboard sign lease encumbrance to the Dygerts, as
prospective buyers, would likely have caused the Dygerts to back out of their purchase of
a home and lot. (RA 348,349). Approximately a year before the Dygerts contracted to
purchase Lot 2, the purchasers of adjoining Lot 1, Wayne and Amy Clausing ("the
Clausings"), walked out of their real estate closing transaction with Clearwater Oaks
when they learned that the billboard sign lease encumbered that lot. (RA 323, 324, 348,
411, 628). The Clausings did not purchase Lot 1 until they were assured that the
billboard sign lease had been removed from that property. Id.
The Dygerts contracted to purchase their property - Lot 2 - from Clearwater Oaks
on May 17, 1999 - after Clearwater Oaks had filed its lawsuit against the billboard sign
company. (RA 199, 398, 402). Appellee Youngberg signed the contract documents as a
representative of Clearwater Oaks. (RA 199, 301-310).
Before contracting, Appellee Youngberg provided the Dygerts with a copy of a
plat map purporting to show easements of record affecting Lot 2. (RA 377, 378, 389,
603). The plat map showed that the billboard sign lease only encumbered a portion of
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another lot in the subdivision - Lot 5 - which is where a billboard sign is conspicuously
located. (RA 389). When Appellee Youngberg showed the misleading plat map to
the Dygerts, Appellees knew that the plat map was incorrect and that the billboard
sign lease, in fact, encumbered Lot 2, which the Dygerts ultimately purchased. (RA
319,408,411,628).
At the time of contracting on May 17,1999, Appellee Youngberg also provided
the Dygerts with a form real estate document entitled "Seller's Property Condition
Disclosure (Land)," in which he affirmatively misrepresented that: 1) there was no
ongoing litigation affecting Lot 2; 2) there were no undisclosed easements affecting
Lot 2; and 3) there was nothing that should be disclosed that materially or
adversely affected the value of Lot 2. (RA 391, 392, 605-606).
At the time of contracting, the Dygerts requested that they be provided with a
report on the status of title of Lot 2. (RA 612). Shortly thereafter, Appellees, through
their realtor, provided the Dygerts with a preliminary title report from Bonneville Title
Company, Inc. ("Bonneville") that purposefully did not disclose the billboard sign lease
as an encumbrance on Lot 2. (RA 319, 320, 348, 610). All title reports, title insurance
commitments and title insurance policies provided thereafter to the Dygerts by Appellees
or Bonneville failed to disclose the billboard sign lease as an encumbrance on Lot 2. (RA
610).
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The Dygerts have alleged and are prepared to prove at trial that, because litigation
had not removed the billboard sign lease as an encumbrance, Appellees decided to go
forward with sales of lots encumbered by the billboard sign lease, anyway. (RA 319,
348). The Dygerts have alleged and are further prepared to prove that Appellees thus
agreed with Bonneville that Bonneville would "insure over" or "insure around" the sign
lease. (RA 319, 320, 348). This means that the billboard sign lease would not be
disclosed in Bonneville's title reports, title insurance commitments or title insurance
policies as either an encumbrance affecting Clearwater Oaks' lots in the subdivision or as
an exception to title insurance policies. Id. Consequently, the preliminary title reports,
title insurance commitments and title insurance policy issued to the Dygerts did not
disclose the existence of the billboard sign lease. (RA 319, 320, 348, 350, 610).
The Dygerts have alleged and are prepared to prove that both Appellees were
aware of Bonneville's decision to "insure over" the billboard sign lease before the
Dygerts contracted to purchase Lot 2 on May 17,2001. (RA 319, 320, 348-350, 421424). However, Appellees did not inform the Dygerts that Bonneville was "insuring
over" the lease. (RA 349, 395, 610). Rather, Appellees and Bonneville affirmatively
endeavored to conceal the existence of the billboard sign lease from the Dygerts. (RA
319, 320, 348-350,407,408, 610).
The Dygerts closed on Lot 2 on December 21,1999. (RA 346). Appellee Collier
signed the Warranty Deed on behalf of Clearwater Oaks, transferring ownership of Lot 2
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to the Dygerts that same day. (RA 330). Less than a month later, the lawsuit between
Clearwater Oaks and the billboard sign company was settled. (RA 395,407,416,417,
624-628). As part of that settlement, Appellee Collier, on behalf of Clearwater Oaks,
signed and caused to be recorded a document entitled "Acknowledgment of Lease"
which states that the lease "is in full force and effect according to its terms," except that
the billboard sign company waived its right of first refusal to purchase the affected lots.
(RA 402, 416,417, 619). Nevertheless, the Dygerts were never told that Appellee
Collier had signed and recorded a document that re-affirmed the validity of the billboard
sign lease as an encumbrance to the Dygerts' property. (RA 395). Nor did Appellees
request or obtain the Dygerts' permission to execute and record the "Acknowledgment of
Z^e."(RA395,410,627).
When Appellee Collier executed and caused to be recorded the "Acknowledgment
of Lease" in January 2000, neither Appellees nor their LLC, Clearwater Oaks, possessed
a legal interest in Lot 2. (RA 395,402,410, 627).
A year and a half after purchasing their home and lot from Appellees' LLC, the
Dygerts attempted to sell their property to Jeff and Jennifer Mabey ("the Mabeys"). On
May 17, 2001, the Dygerts had executed all documents necessary to close on that sale
and the Mabeys were executing their documents when the billboard sign lease was
disclosed to the Mabeys by the title officer at the closing. (RA 321, 346). The Mabeys
refused to close and their lender refused to lend on the purchase of the home and lot until

16

the billboard sign lease was terminated as to that property. (RA 321, 346, 347, 394, 395,
609). May 17,2001 was the first time the Dygerts learned of the existence of the
billboard sign lease as an encumbrance to their property. (RA 395, 610). The
Dygerts were unable to have the billboard sign lease terminated as to Lot 2 in time to
consummate their sale to the Mabeys, and they have suffered damages as a result. (RA
344-362).
In their Amended Complaint, the Dygerts sued Appellees, as individuals, for: 1)
fraud and misrepresentation; 2) conspiracy to defraud; 3) negligent misrepresentation; 4)
constructive trust; and 5)fraudulentmisrepresentation. Id. All of these claims were
dismissed by the court below on summary judgment. (RA 758-759).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
First Argument
The trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that Appellees cannot be
held liable for tortious acts they themselves committed on behalf of their limited liability
company ("LLC")- Because Appellees individually and actively participated in the
commission of torts that injured the Dygerts, each Appellee is personally liable to the
Dygerts for the injuries caused thereby.2
Second Argument
The trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that Appellees did not
personally owe a legal duty to the Dygerts. Under agency law, Appellees had a legal
duty not to injure the Dygerts in a residential real estate transaction in which Appellees
were acting on behalf of their own LLC.3 As members and agents of the LLC selling
real property to the Dygerts, Appellees had a common law duty to refrain from acts that
were reasonably risky to the Dygerts - even if those acts served the interests of the LLC.4
As members and agents of the LLC, Appellees had a duty to disclose a known material
defect in the property.5 Finally, as real estate developers and agents of the LLC,
2

18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1877; Pentecost v. M. W. Harward, 699 P.2d
696 (UT 1985); Kaumans v. White Star Gas & Oil Co., etal, 63 P.2d 231(UT 1936).
3

Pentecost v. M. W. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (UT 1985); Kaumans v. White Star
Gas & Oil Co., et al, 63 P.2d 231(UT 1936).
4

PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 78 Cal.App.4th 1368 (Cal.App.2d 2000).

5

Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (UT 2002).
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Appellees owed the Dygerts a duty to supply correct information about the property
being sold.6 Each of these duties is a legal duty that both Appellees owed to the Dygerts.
Third Argument
The trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that, since the billboard sign
lease was a matter of public record, the Dygerts could not justifiably rely on Appellees'
representations about the state of title to the residential real property they had contracted
to purchase. Appellees affirmatively misrepresented and concealed material information
about a material defect in the real property, i.e., the existence of a billboard sign lease
that encumbered the property. Accordingly, the Dygerts were legally justified in relying
upon Appellees' representations of the status of title to that property7 - especially given
that the Appellees' representations were corroborated by title reports provided by the title
company that had conspired with Appellees to conceal the existence of the billboard sign
lease. The Dygerts did not have a legal duty to independently search title records to
determine whether the information Appellees provided them was correct. Id. In addition,
justifiable reliance is generally a jury issue.8

6

Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302 (UT

1983).
7

Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302 (UT
1983); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (UT 1980).
8

Robinson v. Tripco Investments, Inc., 21 P.3d 219 (UT App. 2000).
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ARGUMENT
On Appellees' third attempt at summary judgment or dismissal of the Dygerts'
claims against them, the trial court accepted three of Appellees' legal assertions. First,
the trial court accepted Appellees' contention that Appellees themselves could not be
held personally liable for their own conduct committed on behalf of Clearwater Oaks,
their LLC. (RA 754; Addendum A-17). Second, the trial court accepted Appellees'
contention that Appellees did not owe a legal duty to the Dygerts because Appellees were
acting on behalf of their LLC. Id. Third, the trial court accepted Appellees' contention
that the Dygerts could not justifiably rely upon Appellees' representations about the state
of title of the residential real property the Dygerts had contracted to purchasefromthem.
Id.
These issues will be addressed in order below.
I.

Appellees Are Personally Liable for Their Own Tortious Acts Committed on
Behalf of Their LLC.
Tort Law
The Dygerts did not sue Appellees for acts committed by others on behalf of

Clearwater Oaks. Nor are the Dygerts seeking to "pierce the corporate veil" or to hold
Appellees responsible for the debts or obligations of Appellees' LLC, Clearwater Oaks.
Rather, the Dygerts sued Appellees for the tortious acts that Appellees themselves
committed. (RA 344-362). The Dygerts' tort claims against Appellees are based on the
straightforward application of long-standing principles of tort law.
20

Throughout the proceedings below, Appellees sought refuge in the Utah Revised
Limited Liability Company Act, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-101 et seq, from personal
liability for their own wrongful conduct. (RA 200, 201,452, 569). Appellees repeatedly
cited Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-104,48-2c-l 16 and 48-2c-601 in support of their
argument that they could not be held individually liable for the acts or obligations of their
LLC. Id. Although this argument ultimately gained favor with the court below, it
completely missed the point of the Dygerts' claims against Appellees. "The legal fiction
of the corporation as an independent entity was never intended to insulate officers
and directors from liability for their own tortious conduct."9
The personal liability of corporate officers and directors - and members or
managers of an LLC - for their individual wrongdoing committed on behalf of a
business entity is clear. In Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (UT App. 1998),
this Court acknowledged the general rule that ff[a] director is not personally liable for
his corporation's contractual breaches unless he assumed personal liability, acted in
bad faith or committed a tort in connection with the performance of the contract."
(emphasis added.) Stated differently, Reedeker recognizes a tort law exception to the
general rule of business-entity law that officers and directors are not liable for debts and
obligations of the company.

9

See PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 78 Cal.App.4th 1368, 1380 (Cal.App.2d

2000)(emphasis added).
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The instant case involves application of the tort law exception to the general rule
of limited liability for business entities, that is, imposing personal liability when a
principal of a business entity himself commits a tort on behalf of the entity. This
exception is best explained in 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 187710, which states that
an officer or director:
is not liable for torts committed by or for the corporation unless
he has participated in the wrong. Accordingly, directors not
parties to a wrongful act on the part of other directors are not liable
therefore. If, however, a director or officer commits or
participates in the commission of a tort, whether or not it is also
by or for the corporation, he is liable to third persons injured
thereby, and it does not matter what liability attaches to the
corporation for the tort. A contrary rule would enable a director
or officer of a corporation to perpetrateflagrantinjuries and
escape liability behind the shield of his representative character,
even though the corporation might be insolvent or irresponsible.
.. Participation may be found not solely on the basis of direct action
but may also consist of knowing approval or ratification of unlawful
acts.
That a corporate officer is acting for the corporation or within
the scope of his employment when he participated in the
company's commission of a tort does not affect his liability for
the tort.
The liability of a director or corporate officer as a participant in a
tort is distinct from the liability resulting from the "piercing of the
corporate veil." The effect of piercing a corporate veil is to hold the
owner liable, the rationale for doing so being that the corporation is
something less than a bona fide independent entity. On the other
hand, a director or officer who is liable as a participant in a tort

10

18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1877 is reproduced in its entirety in the
Addendum to this brief at pages A-8 to A-12.
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is liable as an actor rather than as an owner. His liability is in no
way dependent on a finding that the corporation is inadequately
capitalized, that the corporation is a mere alter ego of himself, that
the corporate form is being used to perpetrate a fraud, or that
corporate formalities have not been properly complied with — the
absence of such findings does not affect the director's or officer's
liability, {citations omitted)(emphasis added).
This exception to the general rule governing liability of officers and directors
appears to be universally accepted in American jurisdictions that have addressed the
issue. The above-quoted passage from Am.Jur.2d cites 54 cases in support and none
opposed. (Addendum A-2 to A-6). In addition, before the hearing on Appellees' third
attempt at summary judgment, the Dygerts provided the trial court with supplemental
authorities in the form of an article entitled "Personal Liability of Corporate Officers"
that had just been published in the June 2002 edition of "For The Defense" magazine.11
This article cites more than 25 cases around the country supporting the common
law axiom that corporate officers and directors are liable for their own tortious
conduct, regardless whether the wrongful conduct was committed on behalf of a
business entity.. Again, no contrary cases are cited in the article. After a national
search of relevant jurisprudence, we have not discovered a single case supporting
Appellees9 assertion that a member of an LLC is not personally liable for his own
tortious conduct committed on behalf of the LLC.

11

The article entitled "Personal Liability of Corporate Officers" published in the
June 2002 edition of "For The Defense" magazine is reproduced in the Addendum to this
brief at pages A~ 13 to A-18.
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Admittedly the instant case deals with an LLC, not a corporation. However, the
statutory limitation of liability for members of an LLC under Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c601 is similar in scope to the limitation of liability for shareholders of a corporation
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-622 and for partners in a limited liability
partnership provided in Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-12 (2).
Therefore, the same basic principles should apply. Above all else is the principle
of limited liability, which, for LLC's, is codified in Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-104 ("A
company formed under this chapter is a legal entity distinct from its members."), 48-2c116 ("A member or manager of a company is not a proper party to proceedings by or
against a company.") and 48-2c-601, which provides:
Except as provided in Section 48-2c-602, no organizer, member,
manager, or employee of a company is personally liable under a
judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a
debt, obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or
omissions of the company or of any other organizer, member,
manager, or employee of the company.
The common law of tort unambiguously imposes personal liability on corporate
officers and directors for their own wrongdoing. Therefore, the question now before this
Court is whether the Utah Revised Limited Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-101,
et seq., establishes different liability standards for members of LLC's.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-601 is key to answering that question. The operative
language of section 601 reads: "no member... is personally liable . . . for a debt,
obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or omissions of the company or of
24

any other organizer, member, manager, or employee of the company." {Emphasis added).
The meaning of section 601 is plain: A member is not personally liable for the acts
of any other person on behalf of the LLC. Section 601, however, does nothing to
alter or limit a member's common law liability under tort or agency law for the
member's own tortious acts. Therefore the common law prevails,12 and members of
LLC's are just as personally liable for their own wrongful acts as officers and directors
are for theirs. Simply put, a tortfeasor is a tortfeasor wherever he may be found.
This position is supported by commentators who have reviewed LLC enabling
statutes around the country. See "Those Delaware LLCS-Another Look How They Could
Work For You? Frederic J. Bendremer,10 -JUN Bus.L.Today 43, 45 (The protections
against personal liability conferred by the act are not necessarily absolute.... Personal
liability may also result from certain types of tortious or otherwise wrongful
conduct "){emphasis added); "Limited Liability Companies: Issues In Member
Liability" Karin Schwindt, 44 UCLA L.Rev. 1541, 1548 ("Regardless of one's status as
a member of an LLC, that member cannot escape liability for her personal misconduct.
The most obvious example is the commission of a tort. According to well-established
tort law principles, '[a] tort is no less a tort for being committed in the service of a
separate legal person.' If a member commits a tort while in the course of LLC
business, she may be held personally liable for that tort."){emphasis added); "Tax-

12

See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1
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Advantaged Securities Handbook, Chapter 12A. The Limited Liability Company" Robert
J. Haft and Peter M. Fass, 2 Tax Adv. Sec. Handbook § 12A:7,2002 ("A member or
manager is liable, however, for his own acts or omissions, including liability for a
crime, a tort, or a breach of contract undertaken in his own right.")(emphasis
added); N.J. Forms Legal & Bus. § 18A:3,2002 ("However, inherent in the concept of
limited liability is the fact that members and managers, employees and agents, are
not insulated from liability resulting from their own wrongdoings, such as tort or
professional malpractice ")(emphasis added); "Asset Protection: Domestic and
International Law And Tactics, Chapter 18 Limited Liability Companies" Duncan E.
Osborne and Elizabeth Morgan Shurig, 2 Asset Protection: Dom. & Int'l L. & Tactics §
18:08, 2002 ("In addition, criminal and other statutes, as well as common law
principles, may impose liability on a member or manager who commits a crime,
tort, or other violation while acting on behalf of a limited liability
company. "){emphasis added)}3
Of course, the commentators are right. "A contrary rule would enable a [member]
of a [limited liability company] to perpetrate flagrant injuries and escape liability behind
the shield of his representative character, even though the [limited liability company]

13

See also Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum, L.L.C, 70 S.W. 3d 252 (Tex.App- San
Antonio, 2001)(Genuine issue of material fact as to whether member of LLC had
committed an independent tort precluded summary judgment for member in negligence
action brought by injured employee of LLC).
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might be insolvent or irresponsible."14
Agency Law
The Dygerts' case is also governed by long-standing principles of agency law. In
Pentecost v. M. W. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699 (UT 1985), the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
If an agent commits a tort while acting on behalf of his principal, the fact
that he is an agent does not insulate him from liability to the injured party.
The agent's liability is determined solely upon the common-law
obligation that every person must so act or use that which he controls
as not to injure another.... [WJhether he is acting on his own behalf or
for another, an agent who violates a duty which he owes to a third
person is answerable to the injured party for the consequences. It is no
excuse to an agent that his principal is also liable for a tort.... Nor is an
agent who is guilty of tortious conduct relieved from liability merely
because he acted at the request, or even at the command or direction, of the
principal, unless he is exercising a privilege of the principal to commit the
act. 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 300 (l962)(footnotes omitted){emphasis
added).
Nearly fifty years before Pentecost, the Supreme Court had recognized that "the agent is
responsible to third persons when he is negligent in the performance of the duties
which he undertakes, whether such act be termed misfeasance or nonfeasance."15
Tort and Agency Law
More than twenty years ago, the United States District Court for the Northern

14

18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1877, supra; Addendum pages A-2 to A-6.

15

Kaumans v. White Star Gas & Oil Co., et al, 63 P.2d 231, 238 (UT
I936)(emphasis added).
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District of California16 recognized that principals of business entities have personal
liability under both tort and agency law theories:
Basic principles of tort and agency law provide the starting point for
defining those circumstances. An agent "who does an act otherwise
a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the
command of the principal or on account of the principal." Applied
to corporations, this rule of agency law means that "(a)n officer
or director is, in general, personally liable for all torts which he
authorizes or directs or in which he participates,
notwithstanding that he acted as an agent of the corporation
and not on his own behalf.'1 Courts have, however, consistently
stated that a corporate executive will not be held vicariously liable,
merely by virtue of his office, for the torts of his corporation.
Personal liability must be founded upon specific acts by the
individual director or officer, {citations omitted)(emphasis added)
Under the rules of tort and agency, Appellees would be liable to the Dygerts
if a jury finds that Appellees committed the tortious acts alleged in the Dygerts5
Amended Complaint. As the only two members of their LLC, Appellees effectively
stood in the position of officers and directors of that business entity. And, as noted
above, members of an LLC are just as liable under tort law for their own misdeeds as are
corporate officers and directors. Therefore, the principles of officer and director liability
set forth in 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1877, supra, apply to Appellees.
In addition, Appellees were acting as members and agents of their LLC in their
interactions with, and conduct toward, the Dygerts. As agents of the LLC, Appellees are

l6

Murphey Tugboat Co., Ltd. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., Ltd, 467
F.Supp. 841, 850 (N.D. Cal. 1979), ajfd 658 F.2d 1256,1257 (9th Cir. 1981), cert,
denied, 455 U.S. 1018, 102 S.Ct. 1713 (1982).
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subject to the venerable principles of agency liability set forth in Pentecost v. M. W.
Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (UT 1985) and Kaumans v. White Star Gas & Oil Co., et al, 63
P.2d231(UT1936).
In reviewing the rulings of the court below, this Court must consider the facts and
inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the Dygerts.17 In their Amended
Complaint, memoranda and exhibits submitted to the court below, the Dygerts have
alleged and are prepared to prove at trial that:
•

Appellees personally knew the billboard sign lease encumbered Lot 2
before and after the Dygerts purchased the property (RA 347, 408, 414417);

•

Appellees personally knew that disclosure of the lease to the Dygerts would
likely cause the Dygerts to refuse to close on their purchase of Lot 2, as the
Clausings had done a year earlier (RA 323, 324, 348, 411);
Appellees personally knew that their LLC had filed a lawsuit against the
billboard sign company before the Dygerts contracted to purchase Lot 2
and that the lawsuit continued until after the Dygerts closed on the
purchase of the property (RA 348, 349, 395,407, 411, 414-417);

•

Appellees personally knew that the billboard sign lease was a material

17

Low v. City ofMonticello, 54 P.3d 1153, 1157 (UT 2002)("Additionally, when
reviewing a grant of summary judgment," fwe view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.1")
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defect - "something which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence and
prudence would think to be of some importance in determining whether to
buy or sell."18 - affecting Lot 2 before and after the Dygerts contracted to
purchase their property (RA 323, 324, 348);
Appellees personally conspired among themselves and with Bonneville to
conceal information about the billboard sign lease (RA 348, 349, 352-355);
Appellees personally knew that Bonneville had agreed to "insure over" the
lease encumbrance to Lot 2 and therefore would issue preliminary title
reports and title commitments that did not disclose the existence of the
billboard sign lease (Id.);
Appellees personally knew that Bonneville Title Company would issue a
title insurance policy that did not list the billboard sign lease as an
exception to the policy (RA 348, 349);
Appellee Youngberg intentionally provided the Dygerts a copy of a plat
map showing that the billboard sign lease only encumbered Lot 5, where
the billboard is conspicuously located, when Appellee Youngberg knew
that the lease also encumbered Lot 2 (RA 319, 377, 378, 389,408, 411);
At the time of contracting, Appellee Youngberg completed, signed and
provided the Dygerts with a completed form document entitled "Seller's

Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 242 (UT 2002).
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Property Condition Disclosure (Land)" in which he affirmatively
misrepresented that there was no ongoing litigation affecting Lot 2, that
there were no undisclosed easements affecting Lot 2, and that there was
nothing that should be disclosed that materially or adversely affected the
value of Lot 2 (RA 391, 392);
Appellees, at the Dygerts' request and through their realtor, provided the
Dygerts with a preliminary title report from Bonneville that purposefully
did not disclose the billboard sign lease as an encumbrance on Lot 2 (RA
608-610);
Appellees never told the Dygerts about the billboard sign lease affecting
Lot 2 or the litigation over the billboard sign lease as it affected Lot 2
before or after the Dygerts purchased Lot 2 (RA 395);
On December 21,1999, Appellee Collier signed a Warranty Deed
conveying Lot 2 to the Dygerts (RA 330);
In January 2000, Appellee Collier, without the Dygerts' knowledge and
consent, signed and caused to be filed an "Acknowledgment of Lease" that
re-affirmed the validity of the billboard sign lease as an encumbrance to
Lot 2 (RA 395,402, 410,416, 417);
In May 2001, the Dygerts sale of their property (Lot 2 and a house) failed
when the buyers learned at closing of the existence of the billboard sign

31

lease and walked out of the closing transaction (RA 321, 346, 347, 394,
395);
•

In May 2001, the buyers' lender refused to lend on the sale of the Dygerts'
property until the billboard sign lease was terminated as an encumbrance
on that property (RA 395); and

•

The Dygerts have been injured and their injuries were proximately caused
by Appellees' tortious conduct (RA 344-362).

Therefore, the trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that Appellees
could not be held liable to the Dygerts for acts Appellees' committed on behalf of their
LLC, Clearwater Oaks.
II.

Appellees Individually Owed Multiple Duties to the Dygerts, Including: 1) A
Duty Not to Injure: 2) A Duty to Refrain from Acts that Were Reasonably
Risky: 3) A Duty to Disclose a Material Defect: and 4) A Duty to Supply
Correct Information.
Duty Not To Injure
As set forth above, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized the common law duty

of an agent to a third party with whom the agent transacts on behalf of a principal.19
Duty To Refrain From Risky Acts
Other courts have gone a step further, specifically addressing the duty a principal
of a business entity owes to persons with whom the principal deals on behalf of the

19

Pentecost v. M. W. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (UT 1985); Kaumans v. White Star
Gas & Oil Co., et al, 63 P.2d 231, 238 (UT 1936).
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entity. For example, the California Second District Court of Appeals in PMC, Inc. v.
Kadisha, 78 Cal.App.4th 1368, 1381 (2000), stated:
A corporate officer or director, like any other person, owes a
duty to refrain from injuring others. In the context of a
negligence claim, the Supreme Court has held that, like any other
person, "directors individually owe a duty of care, independent of
the corporate entity's own duty, to refrain from acting in a manner
that creates an unreasonable risk of personal injury to third parties.11.
.. Stated differently, the Supreme Court held: "Like any other
citizen, corporate officers have a societal duty to refrain from
acts that are reasonably risky to third persons even when their
shareholders or creditors would agree that such conduct serves
the institution's best interests, {emphasis added; citations omitted)
Duty to Disclose Known Material Defects
In Utah "sellers of real property owe a duty to disclose material known defects
that cannot be discovered by a reasonable inspection by an ordinary prudent buyer."20
Appellees, however, chose to do just the opposite. Behind the shield of their LLC, they
made affirmatively misleading statements to, and concealed material information from,
the Dygerts about the existence of the billboard sign lease.
Duty to Supply Correct Information
Appellees are real estate developers who owed the Dygerts a distinct duty to
supply correct information about Lot 2. Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title
Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302 (UT 1983). In Christenson, the Supreme Court recognized

20

Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 241 (UT 2002), citing Mitchell v.
Christensen, 31 P.3d 572.
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that a person who is involved in a real estate transaction - but not as a party - may have a
duty to supply accurate information to the buyer even though the person is not in privity
with the buyer, stating: "If, however, 'the information is given in the capacity of one in
the business of supplying such information, that care and diligence should be exercised
which is compatible with the particular business or profession involved.'" Id. at 305.
In the instant case, Appellees are developers who deal in the business of
developing and selling real property. Because they sold real estate to the Dygerts
through their LLC, Appellees were not individually in privity with the Dygerts in the
transaction. Nevertheless, because of their superior position as developers with
specialized knowledge about real estate transactions, Appellees owed the Dygerts "the
duty of care to insure the accuracy and validity of the information" they provided the
Dygerts. Id.
The court below erred by concluding as a matter of law that Appellees did not
personally owe a duty to the Dygerts.
III.

The Dygerts Justifiably Relied Upon Appellees Misrepresentations About
The True State Of Title To The Property They Were Purchasing.
The law in Utah is crystal clear on this issue. A buyer may justifiably rely on a

seller's statements about the true state of title to real property because a buyer has no duty
to examine official title records in the recorder's office to determine whether the seller's
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representations are true.21 In Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co,,
666 P.2d 302,3Q7 (UT 1983), the Supreme Court held:
Generally a failure to examine public records does not defeat an
action for a false representation because in most cases there is no
duty to make such an examination. 37 AmJur.2d Fraud and Deceit §
263 (1968). Thus, it has been held in fraud cases that a plaintiff who
contracts to buy property is under no duty to examine public records
to ascertain the true state of title claimed by the seller.
Moreover, a buyer has no duty to look behind the seller's statements about real
property when the buyer has no indication there is a problem with the seller's
representations about the property.22 Likewise, a buyer is not barred from recovering
from the seller on a fraud claim simply because the buyer had the opportunity to
investigate the truth of the seller's representations and chose not to.23 As long as the
Dygerts did not undertake to independently search the title records on Lot 2 before their
purchase, they could rely on Appellees' representations.24
The Dygerts have alleged and are prepared to prove that Appellees affirmatively
misrepresented and concealed the true state of title of Lot 2. First, Appellee Youngberg

v21 Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302 (UT
1983).
22

Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,1246 (UT 1980)("[A] vendee of real property,
in the absence of facts putting him on notice, has no duty to investigate to determine
whether the vendor has misrepresented the area conveyed.").
23

Id. ("Nor is a vendee estopped from recovering in an action for deceit because
he had the opportunity to inspect or otherwise check the property prior to purchase.").
24

Id.
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provided the Dygerts with a copy of a plat map showing a cross-hatched portion of Lot 5,
indicating that the billboard sign lease only affected that lot. The Dygerts are prepared to
prove that, at the time he showed the Dygerts the misleading plat map, Appellee
Youngberg personally knew that the billboard sign lease affected all the lots his LLC was
attempting to sell, including Lot 2.
Then, at the time of contracting (May 17,1999), Appellee Youngberg provided
the Dygerts with a form real estate document entitled "Seller's Property Condition
Disclosure (Land)" in which he affirmatively misrepresented that there was no ongoing
litigation affecting Lot 2, that there were no undisclosed easements affecting Lot 2, and
that there was nothing that should be disclosed that materially or adversely affected the
value of Lot 2.
Also at the time of contracting, the Dygerts requested that they be provided with a
preliminary title report, showing the status of title for Lot 2. Appellees knew that
Bonneville would issue a title report, but the title report would conceal the existence of
the billboard sign lease. Approximately a week after they made their request for such a
report, the Dygerts were provided a preliminary title report by Clearwater Oaks' realtor.
Neither that report nor any other title report, title commitment or title insurance policy
thereafter provided to the Dygerts revealed the existence of the billboard sign lease as a
material encumbrance on Lot 2.
The Dygerts did not independently search title records or retain a qualified person
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to search title records to determine whether the information provided by Appellees was
correct. They were under no duty to do so.25 Together, Christenson and Dugan stand
for the proposition that a buyer of real property does not have legal duty to ferret out
fraud when such buyer has no notice or other indication of potentially fraudulent activity
by the seller. A buyer may reasonably rely on the representations of the seller.
There is great wisdom in the common law. The pure caveat emptor approach
espoused by Appellees, and accepted by the court below, would wreak havoc on real
estate transactions in this state. Prudent buyers, looking for fraud in every transaction,
would not be able to accept as true any information provided by sellers. A prudent
buyer, to protect herself from defects in title, would not be able to rely upon title reports
prepared by a title company like the Dygerts did. Instead, she would be forced to hire a
lawyer to issue a title opinion. Many of the standard practices we take for granted in real
property transactions in Utah would end, making such deals more difficult and
expensive.
Constructive Notice Not Applicable
The trial court's ruling that the Dygerts cannot demonstrate justifiable reliance
suggests that the court believed the Dygerts were on constructive notice about the
fraudulent nature of Appellees' actions merely because the billboard sign lease was

25

Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302, (UT
1983) and Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (UT 1980).
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recorded. But the fact that an instrument regarding an interest in real property is
recorded is not, by itself, sufficient to put a party on notice offraudulentconduct. In
Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188,1195 (UT 1993), the Supreme Court stated:
'Mere constructive notice of the deed by reason of its being filed for
record is not notice of the facts constituting fraud.' Recording a
deed or entering judgment alone is not enough in some instances to
apprise a party of thefraudulentnature of a conveyance.
Since the Dygerts did not have a duty to search the title records,26 they cannot be
charged with constructive notice of afraudperpetrated by Appellees.
Justifiable Reliance Is Jury Issue
The trial court's conclusion, as a matter of law, that the Dygerts "cannot
demonstrate a justifiable reliance" on information provided by Appellees invades the
province of the jury.27 Therefore, this conclusion should be reversed.

26

Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co,, 666 P.2d 302, (UT
1983) and Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (UT 1980).
27

Robinson v. Tripco Investments, Inc., 21 P.3d 219, 224 (UT App. 2000)("[T]he
question of whether a plaintiff was reasonable in his or her reliance is 'usually a matter
within the province of the jury.'").
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CONCLUSION
This is a "garden variety" fraud case.28 Appellees should not be given safe harbor
under their LLC from the consequences of their wrongful conduct. Neither the
legislature nor the common law has intended to countenance such protections.
Accordingly, the Dygerts respectfully request that this Honorable Court reverse
the trial court's order granting summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court
with directions to set a jury trial on all counts alleged against Appellees in the Dygerts'
Amended Complaint.
DATED this 3rd day of June, 2003.
BEARNSON & PECK, LC

v-

V»»»-*-"*

" ^

^ — ^

Marty E. Moore
Attorneys for Daniel K. and Stephanie C.
Dygert

28

Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766,770 (UT 1985)("[T]hese facts present
something of a 'garden variety' fraud case, in which one part intentionally or recklessly
misrepresents a presently existing material fact, thereby inducing another to reasonably
rely and act upon that falsehood to the other's detriment.").
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL K. DYGERT and STEPHANIE
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ORDER
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Defendants, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg's, Motion for Summary Judgment
came before this Court for oral argument n August 20,2002. The Court, having taken the matter
under advisement, rendered its decision on September 17, 2002 via telephone conference.
Plaintiffs were represented by their attorney, Marty Moore, and Defendants Collier and
Youngberg were represented by their attorney, Robert W. Hughes. The Court having reviewed
Defendants Collier and Youngberg's Motion and supplemental Memoranda and Plaintiffs'
Memorandum, the other pleadings and papers on file herein, the Court having made and entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
A-l

1.

Defendants Collier and Youngberg's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

2.

Plaintiffs' Complaint against Defendants Collier and Youngberg is dismissed.

DATED this

(f^

day of

Qt$r.

, 2002

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE GLEN R. DA]
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

MARTY E. MOORE
Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF M An X^C.
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to Brad N. Beamson and
Marty E. Moore, BEARNSON & PECK, L.C., 74 West 100 North, Logan, Utah 84321, and
StephenF. Noel, SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, 4723 HarrisonBlvd. #200, Ogden, Utah
84403, postage prepaid, this ? P

day of September, 2002.
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ROBERT W.HUGHES #1573
i___
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Attorney for Defendants
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SECOND
-^
Clearwater Oaks, L.C., Alan M. Collier, Mike Vmmphfrfl niSTRICT COURT
111 East 300 South, Suite 370
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-9075

f\

c.:

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL K. DYGERT and STEPHANIE C.
DYGERT,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 010800994
Judge Glen R. Dawson

vs.
CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY;
BONNEVILLE TITLE COMPANY, INC.;
CLEARWATER OAKS, L.C.; ALAN M.
COLLIER; and MIKE YOUNGBERG,
Defendants.

Defendants, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg's, Motion for Summary Judgment came
before the Court for oral argument on August 20,2002. The Court, having taken the matter under
advisement, rendered its decision on September 17,2002 via telephone conference. Plaintiffs were
represented by their attorney, Marty Moore, and Defendants Collier and Youngberg were represented
by their attorney, Robert W. Hughes. The Court having reviewed Defendants Collier and
Youngberg's Motion and supplemental Memoranda and Plaintiffs' Memorandum, the other
pleadings and papers on file herein, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C. was organized and its Articles of Organization were

filed with the Utah State Department of Commerce on November 28,1997, and was, at all times
relevant hereto, a valid existing limited liability company in good standing with the State of Utah.
A-3

2.

Defendants Alan Collier and Mike Youngberg were, at all times relevant hereto, the

members of Clearwater Oaks, L.C.
3.

Defendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C. was the owner of a subdivision located in Davis

County, State of Utah known as the "Clearwater Oaks Subdivision" (the "Subdivision").
4.

At no time did either Defendant Collier or Defendant Youngberg personally own the

Subdivision.
5.

Plaintiffs purchased a certain lot in the SubdivisionfromDefendant Clearwater Oaks,

L-C described as Lot 2, Clearwater Oaks Subdivision (the "Property")6.

The purchase ofthe Property by PlaintiflsfromDefendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C. was

an arm's length transaction.
7.

The individual Defendants did not sign personally any documents related to the sale

of the Property to Plaintifls.
8.

At the time the Plaintiffs purchased the PropertyfromDefendant Clearwater Oaks,

L.C, there was a lease affecting the Property in favor of Reagan Sign Company (the "Lease") which
was recorded as Entry No. 1127166, Book 1773, Page 460 in the office of the Davis County
Recorder on the 17th day of May 1994.
9.

Neither Defendant Collier nor Defendant Youngberg individually had a legal duty to

Plaintiffs in the sale of the PropertyfromDefendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C. to Plaintiffs.
10.

Utah Code Ann. §Ann. §48-2c-104 {The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company

Act] provides:
A company formed under this chapter is a legal entity distinct from
its members.
11.

Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-l 16 provides:
A member or manager of a company is not a proper party to
proceedings by or against a company, except when the object is to
enforce a member's or manager's right against, or liability to, the
company.
2
A-4

12.

Utah Code Ann, §48-2c-601 provides:
Except as provided in Section 48-2c-602, no organizer, member,
manager, or employee of a company is personally liable under a
judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a
debt, obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or
omissions of the company or of any other organizer, member,
manager, or employee of the company.

13.

Utah fYirte Ann. §57-3-102(1) provides in relevant part:
Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner
prescribed by this title.,... shall from the time of recording with the
appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their
contents.

The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, now make and enter the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendants Collier and Youngberg as member of Clearwater Oaks, L.L.C. cannot be

held personally liable for the acts of Defendant Clearwater Oaks.
2.

Defendants Collier and Youngberg individually did not have a legal duty to the

Plaintiffs in the sale of the Property by Defendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C, to Plaintiffs.
3.

Plaintiffs had legal notice of the Lease at the time they purchased the Property.

4.

Because the Lease the Plaintiffs claim encumbered the Property was a public record,

the Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a justifiable reliance and therefore the causes of action against
Defendants Collier and Youngberg must be dismissed.
5.

Defendants Collier and Youngberg are not proper parties to the litigation and the

causes of action against them personally should be dismissed.

3

A-5

DATED this

°\

day o£September, 2002
BY THE COURT:

MARTY E. MOORE
Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
LawtoBrad N. Bearason and Marty E. Moore, BEARNSON & PECK, L.C., 74 West 100 North,
Logan, Utah 84321 and StephenF. Noel, SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, 4723 Harrison Blvd.
#200, Ogden, Utah 84403, postage prepaid, this

U
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day of September, 2002.
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AMJUR CORPORATNS S 1877
18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1877 (1985)

Pagel

American Jurisprudence, Second Edition
Current through the May 2001 Cumulative Supplement
Corporations
Anne Christine Haberle, J.D.; James L. Jones, J.D.; Jack K. Levin, J.D.; Eric
Mayer, J.D.; Jody L. Mikasen, J.D.; Leonard I. Reiser, J.D.; Ferdinand S.
Tinio, LL.B., LL.M.
XVI. Rights, Duties, and Liabilities of Directors, Officers, and Employees
[§§1684-1989]
P. Liability to Third Persons for Torts of Corporation F§§ 1877-1891]
1. In General [§§1877, 1878]
Topic Summary; Topic Contents; Parallel References; List of Topics;
§ 1877. GENERALLY
A director or officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts merely by reason of his
official character; he is not liable for torts committed by or for the corporation unless he has participated in the
wrong. [FN79] Accordingly, directors not parties to a wrongful act on the part of other directors are not liable
therefor. [FN80] If, however, a director or officer commits or participates in the commission of a tort, whether or
not it is also by or for the corporation, he is liable to third persons injured thereby, and it does not matter what
liability attaches to the corporation for the tort. A contrary rule would enable a director or officer of a corporation
to perpetrate flagrant injuries and escape liability behind the shield of his representative character, even though the
corporation might be insolvent or irresponsible. [FN81] Liability under those conditions may be recognized by
statute. [FN82] Participation may be found not solely on the basis of direct action but may also consist of knowing
approval or ratification of unlawful acts. [FN83]
Caution: That a corporate officer is acting for the corporation or within the scope of his employment when he
participated in the company's commission of a tort does not affect his liability for the tort. [FN84]
Observation: The liability of a director or corporate officer as a participant in a tort is distinct from the
liability resulting from the "piercing of the corporate veil." The effect of piercing a corporate veil is to hold the
owner liable, the rationale for doing so being that the corporation is something less than a bona fide independent
entity. [FN85] On the other hand, a director or officer who is liable as a participant in a tort is liable as an actor
rather than as an owner. His liability is in no way dependent on a finding that the corporation is inadequately
capitalized, that the corporation is a mere alter ego of himself, that the corporate form is being used to perpetrate
a fraud, or that corporate formalities have not been properly complied with-the absence of such findings does not
affect the directors or officer's liability. [FN86]
If, because of the tort committed by an officer or agent of a corporation, the corporation becomes liable also,
such individual and the corporation are jointly liable and may be joined as defendants. [FN87]
Practice guide: If a director or officer is sought to be held individually liable for a tort committed by the
corporation, he must be made a party in the action against the company. Otherwise, the director or officer cannot
be held personally liable without an opportunity to relitigate the issue of the amount of damages. [FN88]
Certain aspects of the liability of corporate officers or agents with respect to particular torts are discussed in the
following sections. [FN89] Treated elsewhere is their liability for assault and battery, [FN90] conversion, [FN91]
trespass, [FN92] libel, [FN93] maintaining a nuisance, [FN94] and the infringement of copyrights or patents.
[FN95]
Practice guide: In a suit against a corporation for tort, a corporate officer who is not a resident of the state
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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where the corporation is alleged to have committed the tort (and which is thus the proper forum) may be brought
within the court's long-arm jurisdiction on the theory that he is personally liable for the tort. [FN96]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT by the editorial staff of the Publishers.
Research References:
Validity, construction, and application of "fiduciary shield" doctrine- modern cases, 79 A.L.R. 5th 587.
Supreme Court's views as to validity, construction, and application of Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.A. §§9601 et seq.), 157 A.L.R. Fed. 291.
Liability of dissolved corporation or corporation that forfeited charter in action pursuant to Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.A {$ 9601-9675), 123 A.L.R.
Fed. 461.
Liability of individual shareholder, or director of corporation that owned contaminating facility in action
pursuant to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.A.
§§9601- 9675), 122 A.L.R. Fed. 321.
"Can they take my house?": Defending directors and officers, 81 111 BJ May:244 (1993).
Coolley, Personal Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors In Intellectual Property Actions? 33 Prac Law
79, June, 1987.
Corporate officer liability as an operator under CERCLA, 9 J Nat Resour and Environ L 2:553 (1994).
Defamation, freedom of speech and corporations, 1993 Juridicial Rev 294 (1993).
Environmental crime and punishment; New proposed guidelines for evaluating corporate culpability, 17 Los
Angeles Law 7:20 (1994).
Note, The Fiduciary Shield Doctrine: Minimum Contacts in a Special Context. 65 Bos U LR 967, November,
1985.
Unpacking limited liability: Direct and vicarious liability of corporate participants for torts of the enterprise, 47
VandLR 1(1994).
Cases:
Where a third party who entered into a contract with a corporation brought suit against the president-director of
the corporation alleging tortious interference with contract, the president-director was not shielded from liability
for tortious interference because the president-director only owned 40 percent of the corporation and lacked the
unity of financial interest that would warrant considering him the same entity as the corporation. Holloway v
Skinner (1993, Tex App Austin) 860 SW2d 217, writ of error filed (Oct 26, 1993).
[FN79]. Numerous decisions from many jurisdictions support this rule, including the following representative
cases: Washington Gas Light Co. v Lansden, 172 US 534, 43 L Ed 543, 19 S Ct 296; Shingleton v Armor Velvet
Corp. (CA5 Ga) 621 F2d 180, 6 Fed Rules Evid Serv 685; Escude Cruz v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (CA1
Puerto Rico) 619 F2d 902; Martin v Wood (CA3 Pa) 400 F2d 310; Zubik v Zubik (CA3 Pa) 384 F2d 267, cert
den 390 US 988, 19 L Ed 2d 1291, 88 S Ct 1183; Polo Fashions, Inc. v Branded Apparel Merchandising, Inc.
(DC Mass) 592 F Supp 648, 225 USPQ 480; United States v ACB Sales & Service, Inc. (DC Ariz) 590 F Supp
561; Candy H. v Redemption Ranch, Inc. (MD Ala) 563 F Supp 505; Hamilton Bank & Trust Co. v Holliday
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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(ND Ga) 469 F Supp 1229, CCH Fed Secur L Rep 196953; Murphy Tugboat Co. v Shipowners & Merchants.
Towboat Co. (ND Cal) 467 F Supp 841, 1979-1 CCH Trade Case? 162527, affd (CA9 Cal) 658 F2d 1256, 1981-1
CCH Trade Cases f64000, cert den 455 US 1018, 72 L Ed 2d 135, 102 S Ct 1713; Smith v Fidelity Mut. Life
Ins. Co, (SD NY) 444 F Supp 594; Independence Tube Corp. v Copperweld Corp. (ND 111) 74 FRD 462, 1977-1
CCH Trade Cases H61416, 23 FR Serv 2d 736; Re Wade (F BC ND 111) 26 BR 477; Crigler v Salac (Ala) 438 So
2d 1375; United States Liability Ins. Co. v Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal 3d 586, 83 Cal Rptr 418, 463 P2d 770;
Middlesex Ins. Co. v Mann (4th Dist) 124 Cal App 3d 558, 177 Cal Rptr 495; Dunbar v Finegold (Colo App) 501
P2d 144; Scribner v O'Brien, Inc., 169 Conn 389, 363 A2d 160; Gordon Finance, Inc. v Belzaguy (Fla App D3)
216 So 2d 240; McLanahan v Keith, 135 Ga App 117, 217 SE2d 420; Rodriguez v Nishiki, 65 Hawaii 430, 653
P2d 1145, 9 Media L R 1349; Cahill v Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P2d 1356; Fure v
Sherman Hospital, 55 111 App 3d 572, 13 111 Dec 448, 371 NE2d 143; American Independent Management
Systems, Inc. v McDaniel (Ind App) 443 NE2d 98; Bowling v Holdeman (Ind App) 413 NE2d 1010; Kansas
Com. on Civil Rights v Service Envelope Co., 233 Kan 20, 660 P2d 549, 32 CCH EPr f 33632; Galvan v
McCollister, 224 Kan 415, 580 P2d 1324; Moak v Link-Belt Co. (La App 4th Cir) 229 So 2d 395, revd on other
grounds 257 La 281, 242 So 2d 515; Baranowski v Strating, 72 Mich App 548, 250 NW2d 744; Patzman v
Howey, 340 Mo II, 100 SW2d 851; Boyd v Wimes (Mo App) 664 SW2d 596; Robbins v Panitz, 61 NY2d 967,
475 NYS2d 274, 463 NE2d 615; Conneil v Hayden (2d Dept) 83 App Div 2d 30, 443 NYS2d 383; Air Traffic
Conference, Div. of Air Transport Asso. v Marina Travel, Inc., 69 NC App 179, 316 SE2d 642; Schollmeyer v
Saxowsky (ND) 211 NW2d 377; Schaefer v D & J Produce, Inc., 62 Ohio App 2d 53, 16 Ohio Ops 3d 108, 403
NE2d 1015, motion overr; Wicks v Milzoco Builders, Inc., 503 Pa 614, 470 A2d 86; Hunt v Rabon, 275 SC 475,
272 SE2d 643; Zang v Leonard (Term App) 643 SW2d 657; Cooper v Cordova Sand & Gravel Co. (Tenn App)
485 SW2d 261; Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v Stewart (Tex App Houston (1st Dist)) 668 SW2d 727, writ dism w
o j ; Grayson v Nordic Constr. Co., 92 Wash 2d 548, 599 P2d 1271; Cato v Silling, 137 W Va 694, 73 SE2d 731,
cert den 348 US 981, 99 L Ed 764, 75 S Ct 572, reh den 349 US 924, 99 L Ed 1256, 75 S Ct 659; Kiel v Frank
Shoe Mfg. Co., 245 Wis 292, 14 NW2d 164, 152 ALR 691.
Specific direction or sanction of, or active participation or co-operation in, a positively wrongful act of
commission or omission which operates to the injury or prejudice of the complaining party, is necessary to
generate individual liability in damages of an officer or agent of a corporation for the tort of the corporation.
Lobato v Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc. (CA10 NM) 261 F2d 406.
The mere fact that a corporation, through its board of directors, approves a transaction which it should have
reason to believe is illegal, does not of itself bring personal liability on the president of the corporation. Alliegro v
Pan American Bank (Fla App D3) 136 So 2d 656, cert den (Fla) 149 So 2d 45.
As to liability of officers or directors for participation in issuance of securities in violation of state securities
laws, see§ 516.
[FN80]. Smith v Cornelius, 41 W Va 59, 23 SE 599.
[FN81]. Representative of the numerous cases in support of this principle are the following: Escude Cruz v Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. (CA1 Puerto Rico) 619 F2d 902; L. C. L. Theatres, Inc. v Columbia Pictures Industries,
Inc. (CA5 Tex) 619 F2d 455; Zubik v Zubik (CA3 Pa) 384 F 2d 267, cert den 390 US 988, 19 L Ed 2d 1291, 88
S Ct 1183; Polo Fashions, Inc. v Branded Apparel Merchandising, Inc. (DC Mass) 592 F Supp 648, 225 USPQ
480; United States v Wade (ED Pa) 577 F Supp 1326; Pocahontas First Corp. v Venture Planning Group, Inc.
(DC Nev) 572 F Supp 503; All American Car Wash, Inc. v National Pride Equipment, Inc. (WD Okla) 550 F
Supp 166; Polyglycoat Corp. v C. P. C. Distributors, Inc. (SD NY) 534 F Supp 200; Citronelle-Mobile
Gathering, Inc. v O'Leary (SD Ala) 499 F Supp 871; MacMillan Co. v I.V.O.W. Corp. (DC Vt) 495 F Supp
1134, 209 USPQ 739; Grove Press, Inc. v Central Intelligence Agency (SD NY) 483 F Supp 132; Re Firestone
(F BC SD Fla) 26 BR 706; Re Inforex, Inc. (F BC DC Mass) 26 BR 515, 9 BCD 1373; Alabama Music Co. v
Nelson, 282 Ala 517, 213 So 2d 250; Chandler v Hunter (Ala App) 340 So 2d 818, 21 UCCRS 484; Rhoads v
Harvey Publications, Inc. (App) 124 Ariz 406, 604 P2d 670, later app (App) 131 Ariz 267, 640 P2d 198;
Jabczenski v Southern Pacific Memorial Hospital, Inc. (App) 119 Ariz 15, 579 P2d 53; Wyatt v Union Mortg.
Co., 24 Cal 3d 773, 157 Cal Rptr 392, 598 P2d 45; Middlesex Ins. Co. v Mann (4th Dist) 124 Cal App 3d 558,
177 Cal Rptr 495; Mayes v Sturdy Northern Sales, Inc. (1st Dist) 91 Cal App 3d 69, 154 Cal Rptr 43; Dunbar v
Finegold (Colo App) 501 P2d 144; Scribner v O'Brien, Inc., 169 Conn 389, 363 A2d 160; Naranja Lakes
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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Condominium No. One, Inc. v Rizzo (Fla App D3) 422 So 2d 1080, later app (Fla App D3) 463 So 2d 378, 10
FLW 245; Orlovsky v Solid Surf, Inc. (Fla App D4) 405 So 2d 1363; Lincoln Land Co. v Palfery, 130 Ga App
407, 203 SE2d 597; National Acceptance Co. v Pintura Corp., 94 III App 3d 703, 50 111 Dec 120, 418 NE2d
1114; Stansell v International Fellowship, Inc., 22 111 App 3d 959, 318 NE2d 149; Howard Dodge & Sons, Inc. v
Finn, 181 Ind App 209, 391 NE2d 638, 26 UCCRS 886; Grefe v Ross (Iowa) 231 NW2d 863; Kansas Com. on
Civil Rights v Service Envelope Co., 233 Kan 20, 660 P2d 549, 32 CCH EPI • 33632; Henkin, Inc. v Berea
Bank & Trust Co. (Ky App) 566 SW2d 420, 23 UCCRS 1225; H. B. "Buster" Hughes, Inc. v Bernard (La) 318
So 2d 9, later app (La App 4th Cir) 355 So 2d 1027; Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md 295,
340 A2d 225; Levi v Schwartz, 201 Md 575, 95 A2d 322, 36 ALR2d 1241; La Clair v Silverline Mfg. Co., 379
Mass 21, 393 NE2d 867; Trail Clinic, P.C. v Bloch, 114 Mich App 700, 319 NW2d 638; Morgan v Eaton's
Dude Ranch, 307 Minn 280, 239 NW2d 761, 90 ALR3d 912; Little v Grizzly Mfg., 195 Mont 419, 636 P2d 839,
32 UCCRS 1087; Bernier Bros., Inc. v Biron, 109 NH 555, 258 A2d 339; Pacific & Atlantic Shippers, Inc. v
Schier, 109 NH 551, 258 A2d 351; Trustees of Structural Steel & Ornamental Iron Workers Fund v Huber, 136
NJ Super 501, 347 A2d 10, certif den 70 NJ 143, 358 A2d 190; Robbins v Panitz, 61 NY2d 967, 475 NYS2d
274, 463 NE2d 615; Connell v Hayden (2d Dept) 83 App Div 2d 30, 443 NYS2d 383; Bernstein v Polo Fashions,
Inc. (1st Dept) 55 App Div 2d 530, 389 NYS2d 368; United Artists Records, Inc. v Eastern Tape Corp., 19 NC
App 207, 198 SE2d 452, 179 USPQ 824, 1973-2 CCH Trade Case: -74738; Stuart v National Indem. Co., 7
Ohio App 3d 63, 7 Ohio BR 76, 454 NE2d 158; Stony Ridge Hill Condominium Owners Assn. v Auerbach, 64
Ohio App 2d 40, 18 Ohio Ops 3d 26, 410 NE2d 782, motion overr; Beri, Inc. v Salishan Properties, Inc., 282 Or
569, 580 P2d 173; Wicks v Milzoco Builders, Inc., 503 Pa 614, 470 A2d 86; Amabile v Auto Kleen Car Wash,
249 Pa Super 240, 376 A2d 247; Hunt v Rabon, 275 SC 475, 272 SE2d 643; Brungard v Caprice Records, Inc.
(Tenn App) 608 SW2d 585; Gardner Machinery Corp. v U. C. Leasing, Inc. (Tex Civ App Beaumont) 561 SW2<i
897, writ granted; Wichita Falls Grain Co. v Taylor Foundry Co. (Tex App Fort Worth) 649 SW2d 7
While a director or officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts merely by reason of his
official character, yet a director or officer who commits the tort or who directs the tortious act done, or
participates or operates therein, is liable to third persons injured thereby, even though liability may also attach to
the corporation for the tort. Evans v Rohrbach, 35 NJ Super 260, 113 A2d 838.
[FN82]. Admiral Corp. v Cohen, 68 Misc 2d 687, 327 NYS2d 422.
[FN83J. Murphy Tugboat Co. v Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co. (ND Cal) 467 F Supp 841, 1979-1 CCH
Trade Cases 162527, affd (CA9 Cal) 658 F2d 1256, 1981-1 CCH Trade Case: • 64000, cert den 455 US 1018, 72
L Ed 2d 135, 102 S Ct 1713.
[FN84]. Crigler v Salac (Ala) 438 So 2d 1375; Littman v Commercial Bank & Trust Co. (Fla App D3) 425 So 2d
636, 35 UCCRS 678; Orlovsky v Solid Surf, Inc. (Fla App D4) 405 So 2d 1363; Adams v Brickell Townhouse,
Inc. (Fla App D3) 388 So 2d 1279; Bush v Belenke (Fla App D3) 381 So 2d 315; Dade Roofing & Insulation
Corp. v Torres (Fla App D3) 369 So 2d 98; Cic Leasing Corp. v Dade Linen & Furniture Co. (Fla App D3) 279
So 2d 73; Warren Tool Co. v Stephenson, 11 Mich App 274, 161 NW2d 133, 5 UCCRS 1017.
[FN85]. Generally, as to disregard of the corporate entity, see §§ 43 et seq.
[FN86]. Donsco, Inc. v Casper Corp. (CA3 Pa) 587 F2d 602, 199 USPQ 705; Wicks v Milzoco Builders, Inc.,
503 Pa 614, 470 A2d 86.
The rule under which a director or officer may be held liable as a participant in a tort does not depend on the
same grounds as "piercing the corporate veil," that is, inadequate capitalization, use of the corporate form for
fraudulent purposes, or failure to comply with the formalities of corporate organization. Crigler v Salac (Ala) 438
So 2d 1375.
[FN87]. § 2124.
[FN88]. Dunbar v Finegold (Colo App) 501 P2d 144.
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[FN89]. As to fraud, see §§ 1882 et seq.
As to negligence, see §§ 1889 et seq.
[FN90]. 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery § 126.
[FN91]. 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Conversion § 73.
[FN92]. 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trespass § 75.
[FN93]. 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slandei § 329.
[FN94]. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances § 58.
[FN95]. 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Copyright and Literary Propert) {{198, 199; 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Patent j 410.
[FN96]. Lee B. Stern & Co. v Green (Fla App D3) 398 So 2d 918.
Copyright (c) 2001 West Group. All rights reserved
AMJUR CORPORATNS § 1877
END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
A-12

( COMMITTEE PERSPECTIVES [ JHWta<^»JBtft<ittotf Committee

directors and officers. Generally, an officer
director is not liable for his or her conduct
relation to the acts of the corporationHowev
an officer of a corporation is personally lial
for intentional torts, such as breach of fiducia
duty, conversion, or breach of trust, that he
she commits on behalf of the corporatio
PMC, Inc. v. Kodisha, 78 Cal.App.4th 1368, <
Cal.Rptr.2d 663 (2000) (officer may be liable
competitor of corporation for misappropri
tion of trade secrets where officer invested i
was in control of, and directed or authoriz<
by C. Erik Gustafson
general corporate operations directed towa]
unlawful conduct); Kilduffv. Adams,Inc., 2]
Conn. 314,593 A.2d 478 (1991) (an offic.
who commits a tort is personally liable to tl
victim regardless of whether the corporatic
is liable); First Financial USA, Inc. v. Steing
oong many other purposes, businesses tated by the airline. To maintain the relation- 760 So.2d 996 (Fla.App. 2000) (officer may \
Ftmc
elect to form as a corporation to shield indi- ship and pursuant to the contract, the agency personally liable forfraudin the inducemen
vidualsfrompersonal liability. That continues mustfilefinancialreports on a weekly basis, although actions were committed when ac
to be the fundamental lesson in law school and must pay the airline based upon the con- ingon behalf of corporation); L B. Industrie
Corporations classes, and that appears to be tent of thefinancialreports, including sales Inc. v. Smith, 631 F.Supp. 922 (D.Idaho 198*
the publicly accepted wisdom. Indeed,fromthe data. The contract provides that the goods (officer may be liable for corporation's wronj
clamor in the popular press to "change" the held by the travel agency will remain in trust fill acts that he directs or sanctions); Ande\
law to allow individuals to be held personally until sold. Eventually, the relationship sours son v. Heartland Oil & Gas, Inc., 249 Kan. 451
liable for such business failures as Enron, one when it is discovered that the agency has been 819 P.2d 1192 (1991) (officer and corporatio
would think that an individual, such as an officer underreporting its sales.
may be joindy liable for officer's fraudulen
of the corporation, may not befoundpersonally
While a judgment against the agency for promise of future events involving investmer
liable when his or her actions are cloaked in the breach of contract is an almost certain result, in scheme); Turner v. Wilson, 620 So.2d 545 (Mia
name of the corporation. Of course, nothing most cases it has little or no assets with which 1993) (officer may be liable to corporation3
could be further from the truth—business to satisfy the judgment. Moreover, absent a creditors when he has participated in the tor
people cannot always escape the consequences sense of moral obligation, the individual own- tuous act, or has authorized or directed it, o
of their actions, even when done in the name ers of the business likely believe themselves to has acted in his own behalf, or has had an
of the corporation.
befreefromlegal responsibility for these debts knowledge of, or given any consent to, the ac
A typical factual scenario in which the issue and will not voluntarily repay these "business" or transaction, or has acquiesced in it whei
of officer liability arises in the travel industry (a losses. Looking to the officer responsible for he either knew or by the exercise of reason
field in which the authorfrequendylitigates) the misreporting has often proven a fruitful able care should have known of it and shoulc
is as follows. An airline or ticket seller has en- course of recovery, and, in the past few years, have objected and taken steps to prevent it)
tered into a contract with a travel agency. As courts have generally agreed that personal li- Loprestiv. Termlliger, 126 F.3d 34 (2d Or. 1997
part of the arrangement, the agency will sell ability may befoundin such cases.
(officer may be personally liable to corporagoods and services that are provided and facilition's employees for conversion where fundi
Personal Liability Without
were used for other business purposes anc
Piercing the Corporate Veil
not deposited into ERISA accounts); Texas v
Although an individual may become liable in Mink, 990 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.App. 1999) (ofinstances in which the corporate veil is pierced, freer personally liable where actions caused
one need not pursue that often-difficult path corporation to breach its fiduciary duty tc
to hold an officer of a corporation personally creditor); Cook v. The 1031 Exchange Corp.,
liable. A corporation can only act through its 29 Va.Cir. 302,1992 Va.Cir.LEXIS 31; American Honda Finance Corp. v. Francis, Civ. A. 92
0085-B, 1993 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 442 (W.D.Va.
1993) (finding corporate officer had fiduciary
duty
to company's creditors and remanding case
C. Erik Gustafson is a shareholder in the Alexandria, Virginia office of LeClair
to
bankruptcy
court on question of "whether
Ryan, a professional corporation. Mr. Gustafson routinely represents clients
a'defalcation'
occurred");
Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac
in commercial disputes, in the defense of insurance and surety claims, and in
Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001,1021
prosecuting claims in bankruptcy matters.

^"ticcng the (Consequences

Personal Liability of

Corporate Officers

IMMITTEJ PERSPECTIVES 1 Commercial Mtl0tfR>)i' ^m^i'm&g^
9th Cir. 1985); DER Travel Services, Inc. v. ciary duty if "he participates in, ratifies, or a travel agency who personally participated in
)ream Tours & Adventures, Inc., 2001 U.S. otherwise authorizes the corporations breach the agency's defalcation of funds belonging to
)ist.LEXIS 15581 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (corporate of itsfiduciaryduty... [and] may be held li- the airlines could be held personally liable for
octrine does not provide any protection to able if he fails to exercise the same degree of that defalcation. In In re Folliard, 10 B.R. 875
orporate agents or owners with respect to discretion in the management of trust that a (D.Md. 1981), Pan American World Airways
leir own liabilities and obligations, incurred prudent man would exercise in his own af- filed a non-dischargeability complaint against
s a result of their own acts).
fairs." Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Pishvaian, Robert Folliard, Jr., the vice president and a
"[0]ne whose actions taken in bad faith 155 F.Supp.2d 659,667 (E.D.Va. 2001). Thus, shareholder of Welcome Aboard Vacation Cenmse tortious injury to another is not insu- an officer may become personally liable not ter of Washington, D.C., Inc., a travel agency.
tedfrompersonal liability merely because the only by acting inappropriately, but also by fail- That agency was accredited by the Air Traffic
lalefactor was a corporate officer, director, or ing to act appropriately. The California courts Conference of America, but was terminated by
ATC when it issued drafts for its weekly sales
nployee acting within the scope of employ- have stated this principle more broadly:
A corporate officer or director, like any other that were subsequently returned for insuffiicnt at the time of the commission of the fraud"
cient funds. Following the agency's terminarePontier, 165 B.R. 797,799 (BanknD.Md.
tion,
Folliard filed for personal bankruptcy.
usiness
people
cannot
>94). In Transgo v. Ajac Transmission Parts,
Pan
Am
eventuallyfileda complaint to deterpra, the Ninth Circuit held the president of
mine
the
dischargeability of its debt, alleging
always escape the
:orporation personally liable for the corpora
that
its
claim
arose out of Folliard's conversion
ion's acts of unfair competition.* 768 F.2d at
and defalcation of Pan Am's funds while actconsequences of their
21. The president conspired with another coring in afiduciarycapacity.
ration to imitate the mechanical part manuactions, even when done
Following a trial on the Pan Am complaint,
rtured by another company and try to pass it
the bankruptcy court concluded that while
"as its product. Due to the "instrumental role"
in the name of the
Folliard could be held liable for the debt, the
it the president played in the conspiracy, the
debt could be discharged unless he personally
art concluded that the evidence supported
corporation.
profited from the activity. On appeal, the disifindingof personal liability. Id Thus, even
trict court overturned the bankruptcy courf s
iiout piercing the corporate; veil, an officer
person, owes a duty to refrainfrominjur- ruling, holding that Folliard's participation in
director can be found personally liable. See
ing others. In the context of a negligence the tortious activity alone was sufficient to
TJ&toier,154B.R. 459,464 (Bankr.E.D.Va.
claim, the Supreme Court has held that, find the debt to be non-dischargeable, regard)2) (finding it unnecessary to disaiss pierclike any other person, "directors individu- less of whether Folliard as an officer actually
the corporate veil because the debtor, as an
ally owe a duty of care, independent of the benefitedfromthe activity. 10 B.R. at 877-78.
cer, could be held personally liable for the
corporate
entity's own duty, to refrain from
In Forastieri v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., No. 79ldulent conduct of the corporation in which
acting
in
a
manner
that
creates
an
unrea2544,1983 US.Dist.LEXIS 15698 (D.P.R. 1983),
participated).
sonable risk of injury to third parties...." under similar circumstances, the United States
While it may seem obvious that intentional
Stated differently, the Supreme Court held: District Court in Puerto Rico held two directors
j may result in personal liability, omissions
"Like any other citizen, corporate officers and officers of a travel agency personally responY also lead to liability. Corporate officers
have
a societal duty to refrain from acts sible for the acts of the agency. The court found
equally liable for the torts they cause by
that
are
reasonably risky to third persons that the acts of the two directors were such that
r omissions as well as acts of commission:
even
when
their shareholders or creditors to allow them to escape personal liability "would
Ipecific direction or sanction ofi or active
would
agree
that such conduct serves the be to sanctionfraud,illegality and injustice.''
participation or cooperation in, a positively
institution's
best
interests."
Forastieri, 1983 U.S.DistLEXIS 15698, at *10.
wrongful act of commission or omission
PMC
Inc.
v.
Kadisha,
supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at In granting summary judgment for the
rhich operates to the injury or prejudice of
le complaining party [generates] individ- 1381,citingFrances I v. Village Green Ownersplaintiff, the Forastieri court found that the inal liability in damages of an officer or a Association, 42 Cal.3d 490,229 CaLRptr. 456 dividual officers were liable for their participation in the conversion of the traffic documents
Mrporation for the tort of the corporation. (1986).
(i.e., tickets) and sales proceeds required by
nan v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assothe underlying corporate contract to be held in
m, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141,1145 (4th Cir 1975) Personal Liability of
trust by the agency. Id. at * 13-* 15. Finding the
)hasis added). See also, In re Pontier, su- Officers and Directors
Consistent
with
the
general
principles
disofficer was liable for the conversion, regardless
165 B.R. at 801, citing Cruz v. Ortho Pharvtical Corp., 619 F.2d 902,907 (1st Cir. cussed above, several courts around die coun- of whether the agency's corporate veil should
try have specifically addressed the issue of the be pierced, the Forastieri court stated {id. at
); Camacho v. 1440RhodelslandAve. Corp.,
individual liability of officers and directors of * 14), citing Emmert v. Drake, 224 F.2d 299,
V.2d 242,246-47 (D.C.App. 1993).
icently, a federal court in Virginia elabo- corporate travel agencies that have defaulted 302 (5th Cir. 1955):
Irrespective of good faith or intent, in an
on this standard of potential omission, in their obligations.
instance wherein the corporation had a duty
The Maryland federal district court has
ng that an officer of a travel agency may
to pay out funds from designated proceeds
Id liable for breach of the agency's fidu- found that a vice president and shareholder of
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but such proceeds were used for other pur- personally involved in and authorized a third- 304, citing Universal CI T. Credit Corp. v. Ka
poses, the directors were held personally party agreement, the essence of which was a Ian, 198 Va. 67,76,92 S.E.2d 359 (1956). No
liable because they hadaduty to see that the breach of the obligations that the corporation that intention is not a required element of th
funds were used for the agreed-upon pur- had assumed with the creditor. Because of the tort. Nor is it required that the person cor
pose and they could not excuse themselves officers personal and controlling involvement verting the property do so for his own use.
In the context of travel agency litigatioi
on the grounds that they did not dissipate or in both the creation of the underlying trust
misappropriate the funds nor were in other and in its breach, the court had no difficulty courts have routinely held that the failure t
in finding liability and determining that the adhere to the terms of the underlying contrac
respects derelict in their duty.
u
liability
should be non-dischargeable in the results in the conversion of the traffic docu
The court continued, [w]ith respect to the
ments and/or conversion of the proceeds fror
officer's
personal
bankruptcy case.
context of the failure of a travel agency to remit
their
sale. Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Inter Tran
funds collectedfromthe sale of tickets, the perNote that in order to be personally liable,
sonal liability of officers participating in the the officer need not have actually received per- sit Travel Inc., 884 ESupp. 83 (E.D.N.Y11995
conversion of the funds held in trust has found sonal gainfromthe loss of the creditor. Dixon (holding a 50 percent shareholder personall
clear judicial support." Id. at * 15, citing ATC v. v. Texas, 808 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.App. 1991) (of- liable when he "set the stage" for conversioi
WaMmark Travel 15 Aviation Cases,No. 18,483 ficer may be liable for any tort committed by although he was not personalty involved);imzs
(CCH1980); Folliard,supra.The court agreed the corporation through him, regardless of tieri v. Eastern Air Lines, supra; In re Folliard
that "failure to remit funds collected by a cor- whether the officer personally benefits from supra (where officer was personally liable fo
porate agent which belong to its principal air- the tort committed); Lopresti v. Terwilliger, su-breach of trust); United States v. Weinstein
834 F.2d 1454 (9th Or. 1987) (tickets tha
line [gave] rise to personal liability of those pra; In re Fottiard, supra; Forastieri v. Eastern
corporate employees who participated in the Air Lines, supra; Airlines Reporting Corp. v. were sold without remitting payment to creditor were deemed to fit into the category o\
conversion:' 1983 U.S.DistLEXIS 15698, at Pishvaian, supra.
"goods, wares [or] merchandise... stolen, con*16. Thus, even without piercing the corpoverted or taken byfraud,").See also, Airlinei
rate veil, the officers were liable to the extent Intentional Torts-Is "Intention"
ReportingCorp. v. ATI Travel, Inc., No. 98-1511
of their participation in the defalcation.
Really Required?
In Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Inter TransitAccepting as a legal principle that an officer A (E.D.Va. 1998) (order denying motion seekTraveling 884 ESupp. 83 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), the may be held liable for an intentional tort, how ing dismissal of conversion andfrauddairas
federal court in Brooklyn determined that an high of a hurdle does this present practically? against travel agent).
Under Virginia law, an officer or director may
individual shareholder of a corporation was With respect to the torts of conversion and
liable to the creditorforconversion where he breach offiduciaryduty, it would appear that be held liableforconversion when a corporation
failed to report properly the travel agenc/s ticket the issue of intention is truly just a hurdle, holds property m trust and fails to properly account for it. Cook v. 1031 Exchange, supra. Lisales and also failed to seek approvalforthe sale rather than a bar.
of his shares in the travel agency, which agency
"Conversion" seems to be a polite word for ability of corporate officers extends not only
subsequently was terminated with a $202,000 theft. Under Virginia law,forexample, conver- to tortious acts in which he participates, but
loss, caused solely by the new owners. The In- sion is the wrongfiil exercise of ownership over also those tortious acts he brings about. In re
ter Transit court determined that even though the goods of another, when such exercise ex- Pontier, supra. See also, Michies Jurisprudence,
theaformerMowner was not direcdy involved in cludes the rights of the true owner. McCormick "Corporations'^^l (1999); Restatement(Secmisappropriating the agency's funds, he was v. AT&T Technobgies, Inc., 934 R2d 531,535 ond) ofAgency §343; see also, Lopresti v. Terfully liable for the conversion of those funds (4th Cir.1991), citing Buckeye National Bank williger, supra (applying New York law); Dixon
because his activities in failing to adhere to the v. Huff and Cook, 114 Va. 1,75 S.E. 769,772 v. Texas, supra (applying Texas law).
For example, in In re Bishop, supra, the court
terms of the agreement with Airlines Report- (1912). This is virtually the same definition
ing Corp. with respect to changes in agency used throughout the country. FMC Corp. v. conduded that the officer's entering into and
ownership "set the stageforthe misappropria- Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 915 F.2d 300 (7th Or.facilitating an agreement with a third party,
tion." Id. at 87.
1990); Moore v. Regents of University of Cali-that by its terms violated the trust agreement
A federal bankruptcy court in Virginia re- fornia, 215 Cal.App.3d 709,249 CaLRptr. 494, that the same officer had authorized between
cendy held that the abdication of control and 503 (1988), citing I8Am./wr.2d,aConversion," his company and a creditor, gave rise to liabilresponsibility over trust property to another at 145-46; Waisath v. Luck's Stores, Inc., 474ity for conversion of property at the hands of
individual who ultimately caused extensive S.W.2d444,447 (Tex. 1971). Conversion does the third party. Likewise, a bankruptcy court
losses constituted a breach offiduciaryduty not require that the accused party benefited in Virginia found that where the sole officer of
a corporate travel agency created a lay-away
on the part of the individual officer who es- from the action:
tablished the underlying arrangement with
Any distinct act of dominion wrongfully plan and permitted employees to issue tickets
the damaged creditor. In re Bishop, No. 7-00exerted over the property of another, and without collecting payment, all in violation of
00479 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 2001). Among its rulin denial of his rights or inconsistent there- the underlying agreement, the officer would be
ings, the court concluded that the corporate
with, may be treated as a conversion and it non-dischargeably liable. In re Hashemizadeh,
characteristic of limited liability did not shield
is not necessary that the wrongdoer apply AP No. 97-1266 (E.D.Va. Oct. 27,1999). Finally, in Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Inter Tranthe individual officer from personal liability
the property to his own use.
to the corporation's creditor because he was Cook v. 1031 Exchange, supra, 29 Va.Cir. at sit Travel, supra, the court held an officer liable
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where the liability accruedfromfailing to no- S.E.2d 592 (1984)."One who is entrusted with similar facts have recognized this relationtify the creditor of a change in ownership of the business of another cannot be allowed to ship. Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Incentivelnterthe officer's corporation as required by the make that business an object of interest to him- nationale Travel, Inc., 566 So.2d 1377,1379
underlying contract.
self" Rowland, supra, 174 Va. at 366. Agency (Fla.App. 1990) (creditor contract creates a
Once conversion of property is demon- consists of "afiduciaryrelationship resulting principal-agent relationship, which is one
strated, "the plaintiff is entitled to recover, from one person's manifestation of consent to "based upon the trust and confidence of the
irrespective of good or bad faith, care or another person that the other shall act on his principal in the agent"); Forastieri v. Eastern
negligence, knowledge or ignorance." Cook v. behalf and subject to his control, and the other Air Lines, supra, 1983 U.S.DistXEXIS 15698,
1031 Exchange, supra, 29 Va.Cir.at 304; Univer-person's manifestation of consent so to act." at *11 (analogous contract created princisal CI.T. Credit Corp. v. Kaplan, 198 Va. 67,76,Reistroffer v. Person, 247 Va. 45,48,439 S.E.2dpal-agent relationship that was "prima facie
92S.E.2d359 (1956 ).As Judge Ellis concluded 376 (1994); see also, State Farm Mutual Auto fiduciary? as is the case when one sells the
in Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Pbhvaian: "HadInsurance Co. v. Weisman, 247 Va. 199,203, property of another). And courts in New York
defendant dealt in a similarly direct fashion 441 S.E.2d 16 (1994).
and Texas have applied this to other kinds of
with the ticket stock, as he did with the tickfiduciary accounts. Lopresti v. Terwilliger, supra
ets sales proceeds, say by issumg or specifi(ERISA funds held in trust); Dixon v. Texas,
" 0 1 rporate officers are
cally authorizing the issuance of the ticket
supra (sales tax proceeds held in trust).
stock in a manner contrary to the [underlying
equally liable for the
contract], he would have been liable for converDuty to Others
sion of such ticket stock because his conduct
torts they cause by their
An increasingly recognizedfiduciaryduty arises
would constitute a wrongful exercise of dominbetween corporate officers and their corporion over the ticket stock. And this would be so
omissions as well as acts
ation's creditors. In American Honda Finance
even though defendant lacked knowledge of
v. Francis, supra, the Virginia federal district
the conversion and believed in good faith that
court found that the bankruptcy court had
of commission.
erred as a matter of law by not recognizing a
le had the authority to dispose of the ticket
;tock in that fashion." 155 F.Supp.2d at 667.
When afiduciaryrelationship arises, the fiduciary relationship based on the debtor's
fiduciary should be aware of his heightened status as president and chief operating officer
Sreach of Fiduciary buty
state of responsibility. For example, the fidu- of the company. 1993 U.S.DistXEXIS 442, at
Che law of most states appears to recognize ciary is responsible for keeping the principal * 8. The court stated <c[i]t is well established
hree separatefiduciaryduties in these credi- informed about anything that "might affect that corporate officers occupy afiduciaryreor-agent relationships. First, an agent is under the principal's decision whether and how to lationship to... [the corporation's] creditors."
fiduciary duty to its principal. Second, under zct?Owenv.Shelton,221V*. 1051,277 S.E.2d Id. Likewise, the Ellison court held that as a
he underlying agreement, the agent is a trustee 189,191 (1981); Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer,matter of law, the failure of corporate oflBcers
:>r the benefit of the contracting party with re- 805 F.Supp. 1312,1321 (RD.Va. 1992) (a fi- to properly account for the proceeds of a trust
pect to the ordering, possession, accounting, duciary has a "duty of utmost good faith and for the benefit of their corporations creditor
nd remittance of certain specifically identified frill and fair disclosure of all material facts, as constituted defalcation while acting in a fiduroperty. In this respect, a trustee is under a well as an affirmative obligations to employ ciary capacity. In re Ellison, supra.
duciary duty to account to his beneficiary, reasonable care to avoid misleading one with
inally, a corporate officer or director is under whom he deals").
Conclusion
personalfiduciaryduty to his corporation
Obviously, given the case law discussed above,
id its creditors to act in a manner consistent Duty as Trusteee
there is ample support in many instances to
ith the corporation's interests and its obliga- The elements necessary to create a trust in- litigate the issue of officer involvement of what
ms to its creditors.
clude: (1) sufficient words to create a trust; would otherwise appear to be a business loss.
(2) a deariy defined trust res; and (3) an intent And, given the increasing complexity of comuty to the Principal
toaeateatrustrelationship.Ieowardv. Counts, mercial agreements, particularly those that
trustee or agent is under afiduciaryduty to 221 Va. 582,588,272 S.E.2d 190,194 (1980). rely upon the accuracy of financial reporting
s beneficiary or principal. Rowland v. Kable, Such trusts springfromthe agreement of the or the disposition of assets in which a credi4 Va. 343,367,6 S.E.2d 633 (1940). Such a parties, and all persons who have the capac- tor has taken security, one may reasonably
ationship exists "when special confidence ity to hold and dispose of property can im- expect that the individual officers tasked with
s been reposed in one who in equity and press a trust upon it. Fleenor v. Hensley, 121 fulfilling the corporations responsibilities will
od conscience is bound to act in good faith Va. 367,373,93 S.E. 582,584 (1917). TTirough come under closer scrutiny. One should not
d with due regard for the interests of one the underlying contract, express agency is cre- fear, however, that this liability is unfettered.
>osing the confidence." H-B Ltd. Partner- ated, and the corporation acts as an agent of the
Practical experience has taught that whether
p v. Wimmer, 220 Va. 176,179,257 S.E.2d client, giving rise to thefiduciaryrelationship. an officer will be held personally liable is still
) (1979), citing Home v. Holley, 167 Va. 234,In re Ellison, 265 B.R. 539 (Bankr.S.D.W.Va. a largely factual, rather than legal, question.
1,188 S.E. 169,172 (1936); see also, Allen 1999),<jf<42001 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 20211. Courts While the case law discussed above provides a I
continued on page 59
ilty Corp. v. Holbert, 227 V*. 441,446,318
applying the law of Florida and Puerto Rico to

MMMITTEj NKKOlfej ^ { ^ P i t I # » W 4<ttHM|t.«Internet privacy may not be as prominent as it
was a year or so ago, the risk of enforcement
actions or private lawsuits does not seem to
have declined. Instead, the risk actually ap-

pears to have increased and will likely continue
to inaease in the months and years ahead Accordingly, when developing privacy policies,
effbrts must be directed towards ensuring that

such policies are accurate, implemented correctly, and supported by sufficient training and
continued monitoring of the legal and regulatory environment. HI

Software Contracts, from page 40
ment? In the case of shrink-wrap agreements,
it is easy to determine because the package
was opened, and there is physical evidence,
ie., the software is out of the box. But even in
that scenario, the software provider must prove
that the shrink-wrap agreement was in every
box. If the defendant contends that the agreement was missing from the particular box it
received, the whole issue of the software supplier's quality control and inspection processes
will come into play because it is unlikely that
the software provider will have actual knowledge about a particular box of software. Defense counsel always should investigatetomake
sure that the agreement was infeetcontained in
the box rather than just conceding that point.
When dealing with dick-wrap or browsewrap agreements, if the defendant denies agreeing to the terms of the agreement it is much
more difficult to prove that someone actually
gave her assent Clicking on the appropriate spot
on a computer screen may create a "signature"
but that signature is electronic The software developer will have to present testimony that the
software is designed to end the installation process in the event the user does not accept the
terms of the license agreement However, instances have occurred where clicking the button
that denies assent to the license agreement still
allows installation of the software to proceed.
The integrity and infallibility of that aspect of
the program will be at issue. Defense counsel
should consider the possibility that the software
could be installed even if die defendant did not
agree to the terms of the agreement An expert
should be consulted to evaluate the infallibility
of the software and whether the fact of installation proves that the assent was given.
The software developer's other evidence
will be the software source code data itself,
which the developer may contend reflects that
the defendant clicked on "Yes" in response to
the prompt for its assent to the terms of the
agreement. Obviously, it will require expert
testimony on the part of die software developer to interpret the source code data and explain the implications to the data of clicking
"Yes" or "No" in response to the prompt.

The software developer is probably the only
party in a position to interpret its proprietary
source code data. Defense counsel should consider seeking that underlying source code data
as well as all other information necessary to
interpret that data so that the defense expert is
in a position to evaluate the accuracy of die developers position. The threat that the developer
will have to disclose its proprietary design information may in itself lead to a resolution of
click-wrap and browse-wrap disputes.

Personal Liability of Officers, from page 47
road map to liability, our experience suggests
that to overcome the latent sense of the corporate shield, the court or jury must want to
believe that the individual before them should
be liable. Elements bearing upon this determination of culpability include: the officer's
specific responsibilities as set forth in the
underlying corporate documents, internal
memoranda, and agreements; an analysis of
whether the officer acted in a reasonable
manner, consistent with her responsibilities
to die business and its creditors; whether the
officer profited from the situation (note that
while personal gain is not a requirement of liability, it is damning from the perspective of
most fact finders); and, whether the corporation truly acted as a separate business, rather
than as an extension of the officer. As to this
final point, experience suggests that while a
court may notreachthe high standard of piercing the corporate veil, the appearance of merging one's interests with the corporation's will
go a long way to satisfying the fact finder's
sense of justice in holding die officer personally responsible for the losses. HI

Conclusion
While most courts continue to struggle to apply
provisions of common law contract law and
UCC Article 2 to die variousformsof End User
License Agreements, a movement is afoot, as reflected in die UCTIA, to conceptually change the
formation process of contracts tofitthe needs of
parties to modem software licenses. The present
state of disarray in judicial interpretations of the
law as it applies to these agreements creates an
element of uncertaintyforall parties. Until these
issues are resolved with some uniformity, they
will continue to challenge attorneys, whether
they are negotiating contracts or litigating
breaches of those agreements. HI
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